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CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SELF-CONTROL
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff∗
ABSTRACT
Criminal law, by design, assigns culpability for intentional, volitional
action. Criminal law theory and criminal law doctrine thus both place an
important emphasis on an individual’s ability to control his or her behavior.
Mostly, the law presumes that individuals can exercise self-control; in special
cases, culpability and punishment are lessened because of impaired selfcontrol. Yet despite this central role for self-control, previous scholarship has
not examined the implications for criminal law of decades of research in social
psychology. This Article presents and explores the implications of the most
important findings of recent social psychology research on self-control: first,
that individuals think about their actions differently depending on the temporal
frame of the potential behavior in ways that often impede self-control efforts,
and second, that self-control is a finite resource that can be depleted by other
actions and events. The robust findings about when and how individuals are
able to exercise control over their behavior help to make sense of criminal law
doctrine’s refusal to consider abstract questions of free will in favor of a focus
on whether individuals’ actions were under their control on a particular
occasion. Additionally, the differences in how psychology and law
conceptualize self-control failure, with psychology offering a far broader
definition of these instances, demonstrate just how much the law’s theoretical
conceptions of self-control failure are normative and socially constructed,
rather than positive and observational. The psychology of self-control has
important implications for our understanding of the behavior that leads to
particular criminal conduct and our conceptions of appropriate punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
Criminal law rests on the assumption that individuals—most of the time—
have free will.1 They act in ways that they choose to act, exercising control

1 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952) (noting the “universal and
persistent . . . belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to
choose between good and evil”); Smith v. Armontrout, 865 F.2d 1502, 1506 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“The
whole presupposition of the criminal law is that most people, most of the time, have free will within broad
limits. They are capable of conforming their actions to the requirements of the law, and of appreciating the
consequences of failing to do so.”); Nita A. Farahany & James E. Coleman, Jr., Genetics, Neuroscience, and
Criminal Responsibility, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 183, 207–08 (Nita A.
Farahany ed., 2009) (explaining that there is a fundamental difference between theoretical free will and
criminal law free will: “the criminal law presumes that individuals actively and consciously choose to engage
in criminal conduct”). Indeed, modern philosophers and social scientists have suggested that an assumption of
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over their own behavior. Criminal law is not generally a system of strict
liability: it largely assigns culpability and punishment to actors who have
chosen to engage in criminal acts, rather than to actors who have accidentally
or involuntarily caused harm.2 Despite this central role of free will and selfcontrol in the conceptualization of criminal responsibility, criminal law
scholars have not, to date, considered the implications of decades of research
in social psychology on the mechanisms of self-control.3 This Article suggests
that examining current social psychology research on self-control offers a
novel way to amplify our thinking about crime and punishment,4 helping to
make sense of the way that the law has developed, casting doubt on the
descriptive validity of legal perspectives on self-control and crime, and
offering potential guidance as we think about appropriate levels of culpability
and punishment.
Criminal law scholars conceptualize self-control and its role in the law in a
variety of ways, depending on their disciplinary focus. Advances in
neuroscience, for example, have reinvigorated the debate about the possibility
of identifying the workings of a “criminal brain” through its unique
neurological processes, and about whether free will and self-control are
impossible (or, at the least, implausible) in the face of such (potential)
biological determinism.5 Others have joined in a more philosophical age-old
debate between free will and determinism, exploring the degree to which—if at
all—individuals have free will and can exert it in various circumstances.6 In

free will is critical to the successful functioning of society, regardless of whether or not it is true. See, e.g.,
John Tierney, Do You Have Free Will? Yes, It’s the Only Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at D1.
2 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1, at 253 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that crime typically
requires an act or omission as well as requisite state of mind). But see id. § 5.5, at 288–89 (detailing several
types of strict liability criminal statutes).
3 Only one article has begun to consider the social psychological research on self-control, in the narrow
context of the provocation defense in British law. See Richard Holton & Stephen Shute, Self-Control in the
Modern Provocation Defence, 27 O.J.L.S. 49 (2007).
4 In a project similar in type but different in focus, Steven Sherman and Joseph Hoffman offered a
careful exploration of the implications of psychological research on anger for voluntary manslaughter and the
“heat of passion” defense. Steven J. Sherman & Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Psychology and Law of Voluntary
Manslaughter: What Can Psychology Research Teach Us About the “Heat of Passion” Defense?, 20 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 499 (2007).
5 For discussion of this debate, see Farahany & Coleman, supra note 1, at 206–07; and Owen D. Jones,
Behavioral Genetics and Crime, in Context, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 125, 138.
6 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1587–88 (1994). In
addition, sociological theories largely take a more deterministic approach, suggesting that “delinquency is an
adaptation to conditions and social influences in lower-class environments.” Deborah W. Denno, Sociological

HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF GALLEYSFINAL

504

5/1/2012 7:48 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:501

contrast to both of these approaches, still others use economic principles to
characterize criminal behavior as the product of a utility calculation in which a
potential criminal actor weighs the costs and benefits of his actions in deciding
whether to proceed.7 Such a characterization only makes explanatory sense if a
prospective criminal actor can bring his actions into line with the dictates of
the equation—that is, he has free will and can exercise self-control. These
approaches to criminal law—neurological, philosophical, and economic—
differ in their visions of human behavior and their implications for selfdeterminism.8 But all three approaches rest on a shared belief that whether or
not individuals have control over their own actions when they engage in
criminal acts matters.
Yet even as criminal law and criminal law theorists rely profoundly on the
concepts of free will and self-control, there is rigorous debate over what these
terms really mean—and what they really mean for criminal law. Modern social
psychology research on self-control has developed a working model of how an
individual controls her behavior and has offered several intriguing findings.
First, one of the most recent theories of self-regulation suggests that systematic
differences in the way individuals think about near-term and long-term events
and actions may help to explain self-control failures and successes. People tend
to construe near-future and distant-future events differently, and this has a
direct effect on their efforts to bring their behavior into line with their rational
choices. Second, research has supported the proposition that an individual’s
self-control is a finite resource that can be used up by other cognitive demands
and, furthermore, that an individual can get better at self-control over time.
This work has compared the seeming paradox of self-control to a muscle—that
is, self-control grows weaker with use in the short term but stronger with use in
the long term. What this means for the individual is that, when she has used her
self-control in one setting, she will find it harder to exert self-control in a
situation that immediately follows. But when she practices controlling her

and Human Developmental Explanations of Crime: Conflict or Consensus?, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 711, 712
(1985).
7 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2, at 242 (5th ed. 1998); STEVEN SHAVELL,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 552–56 (2004); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
8 These are not the only lenses through which scholars have analyzed criminal law, and I do not mean to
suggest either (1) that they represent an exhaustive list of perspectives on criminal law or (2) that all criminal
law scholars writing from the standpoint of neuroscience, philosophy, or economics share a common outlook. I
mean only to indicate that several prominent trends in criminal law scholarship share a set of assumptions
about the centrality (if not the meaning) of self-control.
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behavior over time, her self-control will eventually grow stronger and will be
less subject to quick depletion.
Two important broad insights come from examining this psychological
research. First, by considering self-control failure at the micro level—in a
particular moment of action or inaction—psychological research on selfcontrol helps uncouple self-control questions from broader questions about the
existence of free will. Psychological research supports the idea that individuals
differ in the degree to which they can control their own actions. However,
psychology does not take a clear position on the roots of self-control failure,
leaving open the question of whether societal factors or some innate biological
or other characteristics are most influential in dictating the constraints on an
individual’s ability to control herself. Whether or not free will “truly” exists is
irrelevant, psychological research suggests, to the question of whether or not
an individual is able to control his or her behavior in a particular moment. A
person either controls herself by acting in a way that is consistent with a
particular set of norms9 or does not control herself by acting in opposition to it.
The roots of failure to control one’s behavior, important though they may be,
are separate from the question of an individual’s ability to do so at a specific
time and place. Psychology’s robust findings on the fine-grained aspects of
self-control suggest that self-control is a concept with meaning and usefulness
for the law, regardless of one’s viewpoint about the existence of free will.
Second, taking psychological research on self-control seriously indicates
that criminal law may vastly underdescribe the scope of situations in which an
individual lacks the ability to control her actions. That is, acts that the law calls
“uncontrolled” are a mere subset of the behavior that psychology would call
“uncontrolled.” Looking carefully at the psychology research, however, I
suggest that psychologists may sometimes be overbroad in their definition of
self-control failure: in particular, psychologists often assume a set of shared
norms that may not exist. The mismatch between the scope of self-control as
described by psychology and criminal law helps to highlight that notions of
self-control in the law are inherently constructed by the law itself, rather than
reflecting some empirical reality, and that any efforts to define and understand
the concept and role of self-control in law as purely positive, rather than
normative, are misguided.

9 For further discussion of what psychologists mean by acting in a controlled or uncontrolled manner,
see infra Part II.
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In Part I, I briefly demonstrate the ways in which the concept of selfcontrol permeates criminal law, beginning with criminal law theory and then
considering criminal law doctrine. Part II provides a concise overview of
psychological research on self-control. Part III examines in greater depth
psychological research on how information processing about events that occur
at different times may intersect with self-control and considers the implications
of this research on criminal law. Part IV describes the research on self-control
as a finite resource and explores the implications of this “strength” model on
criminal law. Part V offers some preliminary thoughts about potential
implications in particular areas of criminal law doctrine and in criminal law
theory.
I. SELF-CONTROL AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Efforts to neatly classify and bring order to criminal law theory and
doctrine are stymied by the scope and complexity of the field. Criminal law
scholars consider crime from diverse angles, including moral, theoretical,
philosophical, economic, sociological, neurological, and biological
perspectives. They consider not only the scope of what ought to constitute
criminal behavior but also what causes criminal behavior and what appropriate
punishment ought to be. And criminal law doctrine encompasses crimes as
diverse as assault and embezzlement, homicide and tax fraud. Yet in a field as
frustratingly diverse as criminal law, one constant theme is the critical role of
human self-control. In the following sections, I show how self-control cuts
across diverse theoretical and doctrinal perspectives, forming an insistent motif
at the core of criminal law.
I analyze self-control first in the context of criminal law theory and then in
criminal law doctrine, and in each setting I further subdivide my analysis into
broad conceptual groupings. For criminal law theory, I consider three popular
areas of scholarly focus: neuroscience, retributivism/moral theory, and
utilitarianism/law and economics. For criminal law doctrine, I consider
involuntary acts, duress, and mens rea; insanity; justification and excuse; and
mitigation of punishment. However, there may be significant overlap among
these categories, and some scholarly perspectives cut across, unite, or simply
defy them.
Although these divisions are somewhat blunt, my point here is not to
articulate a clear and comprehensive topography of criminal law scholarship
but rather to demonstrate the cross-cutting nature of the concept of self-control
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across the field as a whole. My brief examination of these areas leaves many
nuanced issues, debated by those who write in these domains, to the side—not
because they are unimportant but rather because they are beyond the scope of
this project. My purpose here, again, is simple: to demonstrate the crosscutting and central nature in criminal law of the very concept of an individual’s
ability to control her behavior.
A. Criminal Law Theory
In this section, I explore three prominent strands of thought in current
criminal law theory scholarship: the neuroscience perspective, the
retributive/moral theory perspective, and the utilitarian/law and economics
perspective.10 In each of these, scholars grapple with the question of when and
how individuals control their behavior and what such control, or lack thereof,
means for criminal law. I explain the central role that notions of self-control
play in each perspective in turn below.
1. Neuroscience Perspective
Self-control is perhaps the most acute topic of debate in criminal law and
neuroscience scholarship, a field that encompasses brain science, brain
imaging, and genetics. Growing developments in neuroscience have prompted
challenges to classic notions of responsibility. Neurology suggests both a
certain level of determinism, because it links biological and chemical reactions
in the brain to manifested behavior, and optimism about potential control by
the self and/or society, perhaps through chemical or biological intervention.
For example, brain imaging has helped to reduce criminal punishment in
certain cases by demonstrating that an individual’s brain tumor or other
deformity or injury was one of the causes of criminal behavior. When
neuroscience can show that an individual did not make a “free choice” to act in
certain way, but instead acted that way because of a biological and identifiable
abnormality, juries and courts have sometimes been willing to assign lesser
responsibility and punishment.11 So, too, scholars have suggested that potential

10

Again, although the divisions I have drawn are somewhat rough, and criminal scholars’ work may
often overlap or even defy these categories, the distinctions are nonetheless useful as a basic framework for
discussion.
11 See, e.g., Crook v. State, 813 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2002) (per curiam) (“[T]he existence of brain damage
is a significant mitigating factor that trial courts should consider in deciding whether a death sentence is
appropriate in a particular case.”); Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 463, 469 (Ind. 2009) (rejecting the trial court’s
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solutions to the problem of criminal behavior may be pharmacologically or
surgically possible in some of these cases.12
Others seek to use neuroscience less at the abnormal margins and more in
the mainstream of criminal activity, suggesting that when we understand the
process by which individuals make decisions about criminal conduct, we might
better understand and prevent it.13 Some scholars also argue that new
technology’s ability to map brain changes and processes provides a foothold
for arguments that criminal behavior is not really the responsibility of the actor
but is biologically determined.14 In particular, some practitioners have made
the argument that research on genetic predispositions to criminal behavior, and
on the heritability of criminal propensity, demonstrates that certain individuals’
actions are not truly voluntary.15 Efforts to convince courts to adopt this
perspective have been almost completely unsuccessful.16 Nonetheless, these
challenges based on brain imaging and genetics have generated a robust
response from criminal law scholars, even those who are enthusiastic about the
possible implications of neuroscience on law. Nita Farahany and James
Coleman, for example, forcefully argue that “as a matter of criminal law
theory, [behavioral genetics and neuroscience] evidence should not inform the
assessment of criminal responsibility in . . . any meaningful way.”17 The
intersection of neuroscience and criminal law is, indeed, a textbook example of

imposition of an enhanced sentence in light of the presence of mitigating factors, including “a brain
tumor . . . that affected [the defendant’s] ability to control his behavior”).
12 See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibility but Treatment, 56
U. KAN. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2008) (“[N]euroscience is likely to produce a number of different types of
interventions—surgical, pharmacological, and other—that will be said to prevent, or to lessen the risk of,
continuing criminal conduct.”). But see John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical
Castration, the Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 568 (2006)
(arguing against pharmacological punishment for sex offenders).
13 Jones, supra note 5, at 142.
14 See, e.g., Michele Cotton, A Foolish Consistency: Keeping Determinism Out of the Criminal Law, 15
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 44 (2005); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered Defendant: Neuroscience and
Legal Insanity in the Twenty-First Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 118 (2006); Christopher Slobogin, The
Civilization of the Criminal Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 121, 165 (2005).
15 Deborah Denno notes that, although “[b]ehavioral genetics evidence has not gained widespread
acceptance in current case law,” “[a]t least 48 criminal cases have referred to behavioral genetics evidence” in
a thirteen-year period between 1994 and 2007. Deborah W. Denno, Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal
Cases: 1997–2007, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 1, at 317, 330–
31.
16 See Farahany & Coleman, supra note 1, at 187–205; see also Mobley v. State, 455 S.E.2d 61, 65–66
(Ga. 1995) (rejecting consideration of the defendant’s genetic propensity for criminal behavior).
17 Farahany & Coleman, supra note 1, at 185.
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the tensions at issue in defining the scope of free will, self-control, and
voluntariness.
2. Retributive/Moral Theory Perspective
Moral theorists suggest that the law punishes a set of behaviors that can be
categorized as morally wrong; when people choose to engage in morally wrong
acts, they ought to be punished. The retributive justification for criminal law is
simple: wrongdoers deserve punishment commensurate with the wrong they
intend.18 As John Rawls explains, “It is morally fitting that a person who does
wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing.”19 A core belief of a
retributivist is that an offender ought to be punished “in proportion to her
desert or culpable wrongdoing.”20 Linking the degree of punishment directly to
the gravity of the wrong helps to highlight moral theorists’ suggestion that
punishment is a restoration of a “moral order” that has been violated.21 To
preserve such moral order, Kant insists that society has a duty to punish those
who have done wrong.22
The retributive model “requires some notion of free will that attributes to
humans responsibility for doing wrong in a way that is not attributed to other
animals.”23 Notably, Hegel suggests that punishment for criminal acts honors
the criminal as a rational being.24 Retributive justice is premised on the idea
that someone ought to be punished for his wrongful act when that person knew
that what he was doing was wrong and did it anyway. A moral punishment for
wrongdoing makes no sense when the actor did not understand that the act was
wrongful or did not mean to engage in a wrongful act.

18 Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1338 (1983). Recent
research has added social science data into the discussion of how we determine commensurate punishment—
that is, how we understand desert. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice:
Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing and analyzing
research relating to desert).
19 John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955).
20 Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 843, 860 (2002) (footnotes omitted).
21 See Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 1338.
22 Kant famously claimed that a society about to disband should still execute its murderers on principle.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 198 (Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974) (1887).
23 See Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 1339.
24 David E. Cooper, Hegel’s Theory of Punishment, in HEGEL’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 151, 153 (Z.A.
Pelczynski 1971).
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The law’s vision of moral responsibility “generally requires a
demonstration that the actor made a knowing, rational, and voluntary choice to
act in a manner that breached community norms.”25 As Stephen Morse
explains in an article on criminal law culpability and control, “If it is true that
an agent really could not help or control herself and was not responsible for the
loss of control, blame and punishment are not justified on any theory of
morality and criminal punishment.”26 When individuals act without volition,
they are not liable for their actions. As Morse writes:
Conviction and punishment are justified only if the defendant
deserves them. The basic precondition for desert in all contexts, legal
and otherwise, is the actor’s responsibility as a moral agent. Any
condition or circumstance that sufficiently compromises
responsibility must therefore negate desert; a just criminal law will
incorporate such conditions and circumstances in its doctrines of
27
excuse.

He further notes that “minimal rationality (a cognitive capacity) and minimal
self-control or lack of compulsion (a volitional capacity) are the essential
preconditions for responsibility.”28 However, Morse has argued that “[o]ut-ofcontrol” action does not mean, necessarily, “unintentional” action29 and has
subjected defenses of “out of control” behavior to intense scrutiny. Indeed, he
has suggested that “control” issues are largely understood as defects in rational
thinking.30
So, too, Peter Arenella has noted, “[T]he law’s account of moral agency is
simply a description of those persons who have sufficient control over their
behavior that they can make a rational choice about whether to comply with
the minimal moral demands of the criminal law.”31 A critical assumption
behind retribution is thus that an individual could have chosen not to engage in
the act—could have controlled his own behavior—but instead chose to act
despite an understanding that the behavior was wrong. Retributivists find no
use for punishing someone who did not have the capacity to control himself or
25 Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and
Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511, 1518 (1992).
26 Morse, supra note 6, at 1587–88.
27 Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777,
781 (1985).
28 Id. at 782.
29 Morse, supra note 6, at 1595.
30 Id.
31 Arenella, supra note 25, at 1584–85.

HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

5/1/2012 7:48 AM

CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-CONTROL

511

to choose his actions. However, when someone has the capacity to control
himself, but simply does not do so, he is culpable.
3. Utilitarian/Law and Economics Perspective
The law and economics vision of crime suggests that individuals choose to
engage in certain behavior because the benefits outweigh the costs and that
criminal law provides a set of deterrents against engaging in specific behavior.
Thus deterrence provides society with a way to prevent crime by increasing the
costs of criminal behavior.32 Under this account, criminal law’s job is to create
sanctions such that “the criminal is made worse off by committing the act.”33
An important assumption of deterrence theory is that individuals will weigh the
costs of their behavior (punishment) against the benefits.34 This utilitarian
theory is embraced by law and economics scholars who presume a rational
actor who seeks to maximize utility. This rational actor will engage in an
activity only when its benefits outweigh its costs. Thus the key challenge for
criminal law is calibrating the punishment appropriately, as weighed against
the benefits, to deter crime. The goal is to “set the expected punishment cost at
a level that will not deter the occasional crime that is value maximizing.”35
And volumes have been written on creating an optimal level of sanctions for
deterrence purposes.36
But deterrence only makes sense when, as a general matter, individuals can
assess the consequences of their outcomes and choose their course of action
accordingly: that is, when they are able to control their own behavior.37 The

32

POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 243.
Id.
34 See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Bellamy ed.,
Richard Davies trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION (Prometheus Books 1988) (1789); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed.
2008).
35 POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 243.
36 See, e.g., Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 VA. L. REV.
1197 (2007); Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2008); Steven Shavell,
Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232
(1985); Avraham D. Tabbach, Does a Rise in Maximal Fines Increase or Decrease the Optimal Level of
Deterrence?, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 53 (2009).
37 Although I have described the retributivist and utilitarian attitudes toward human control over one’s
own actions as similar here, Joshua Dressler contrasts them, stating that “the premise of utilitarianism is that
people are generally hedonistic and rational calculators,” whereas “retributivists focus on their view that
humans generally possess free will or free choice and, therefore, may justly be blamed when they choose to
violate society’s mores.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16 (5th ed. 2009) (footnote
33
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utilitarian view presumes that most people will engage in this rational
calculation and decide not to engage in criminal behavior. Those who do
engage in the prohibited behavior thus represent a problem for the utilitarian
that must be explained in one of several ways: the crime was appropriately
committed because its benefits did outweigh its harms;38 society failed to
provide the appropriate level of deterrence;39 the individual miscalculated the
cost–benefit equation; the individual had incomplete, missing, or wrong
information about the costs and benefits; or the individual correctly calculated
the equation but was unable to bring his behavior in line with the appropriate
choice.
This last instance, when an individual cannot bring his behavior into line
with his rationally calculated choice, is difficult to reconcile with law and
economics’ baseline assumptions. For example, in considering the case of an
impulsive, heat of passion crime, Posner suggests not that the individual knew
that the costs outweighed the benefits and yet could not control himself, but
rather that the impulsive individual merely requires a higher level of sanctions
in order to balance the equation properly.40 Heat of passion, that is, does not
eliminate the possibility of self-control. It merely makes exercising control a
less utility-maximizing choice, which thus requires a concomitant increase in
punishment to reach deterrence levels. On the other hand, utilitarian theory
acknowledges that the imposition of punishment for those who truly are not
deterrable serves no function for deterrence purposes: hence a deterrence
proponent has no use for punishing an individual who either cannot make an
accurate cost–benefit analysis or cannot abide by this calculation’s mandate.41
The utilitarian view suggests that there are few criminals who are not capable
of controlling their actions to comport with their cost–benefit analyses but also
suggests that those who are truly not able to exercise self-control are not

omitted). Although Dressler’s description may be accurate, both perspectives do rely on an understanding of
an individual who is able to choose.
38 See POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 242–43 (arguing that a starving man ought to steal a trivial amount
of food from an unoccupied cabin in the woods).
39 See id. § 7.3, at 250–51 (arguing that the theory of criminal sanction is one of deterrence).
40 Id. § 7.4, at 257. On the other hand, Posner suggests that, because the impulsive criminal is less
deterrable, perhaps society ought to “buy” less punishment for these individuals. Id.
41 See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 561–62. Of course, generally speaking, a deterrence system has no
particular interest in punishing any one criminal. Instead, “people are actually fined or imprisoned only to
maintain the credibility of the deterrent.” POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.3, at 250.
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appropriately punished under deterrence theory.42 In sum, the utilitarian model
presumes self-control by the rational criminal actor.
B. Criminal Law Doctrine
Criminal law doctrine generally embraces the idea that individuals are
culpable only when they act with intent and volition. A variety of criminal
doctrines rely on the concept of “control” when determining culpability and
punishment. While scholars debate the premise of true free will and explore the
implications for criminal law of its existence or lack thereof, criminal law
doctrine largely pushes these metaphysical questions off to the side, instead
focusing on the individual’s relationship to the behavior in the moment. The
basic underpinnings of criminal law, actus reus and mens rea, require
intentional action. Prominently, the concept of self-control is also implicated in
inquiries into whether the defendant is insane or, instead, must stand trial. Selfcontrol also plays a significant role in inquiries into whether conduct is
justifiable or excusable. Finally, questions about self-control may arise in the
context of mitigation or enhancement of punishment. I briefly demonstrate the
role of self-control in these areas below.
1. Self-Control and Involuntary Acts, Duress, and Mens Rea
The language of involuntary acts, duress, and mens rea reflects a
preoccupation with self-control as a factor in culpability. As numerous scholars
have noted, an action that is truly outside of one’s ability to control cannot
yield criminal responsibility. The actus reus requirement includes an insistence
that an action be voluntary—a deliberate movement by one’s body is distinct,
legally, from an involuntary physical movement. As Dressler explains, “With a
voluntary act, a human being—a person—and not simply an organ of a human
being, causes the bodily action.”43 Actions that are not the product of the
brain’s conscious control lie outside the scope of the actus reus.
42 However, the system may need to impose punishment to remain credible for future offenders, and
there still may be an independent need to imprison undeterrable criminals for the purpose of incapacitation.
SHAVELL, supra note 7, at 562. As Shavell says:

[I]n many cases where a person is not legally responsible for his act, he will be no less dangerous
to society than if he were responsible. A person who has an uncontrollable urge to set fires, or
who is subject to insane, violent rages, is dangerous to society even though he cannot help
himself.
Id.
43

DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 9.02, at 90.
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However, in cases where there is duress applied by an outside force—for
instance, a situation where someone has a gun to one’s head and insists that
one perform a criminal act—it is clear that the party is acting rationally and is
able to bring her actions in line with her rational preferences to continue,
herself, to live. So, the criminal act is not the immediate product of a selfcontrol problem, per se. But because the circumstances that led to the criminal
actor’s predicament are outside of her control, the law offers lesser culpability
for these acts (except for those involving murder).44
Intent and mens rea similarly work to ensure that the law limits criminal
responsibility to those who mean to do wrong. The law requires a “culpable
state of mind.”45 As Hart said, if we did not have responsibility as a principle,
we should lose the ability which the present system in some degree
guarantees to us, to predict and plan the future course of our lives
within the coercive framework of the law. For the system which
makes liability to the law’s sanctions dependent upon a voluntary act
not only maximizes the power of the individual to determine by his
choice his future fate; it also maximizes his power to identify in
advance the space which will be left open to him free from the law’s
46
interference.

The law does not take action unless there is the appropriate mens rea. This is a
risk, and “[i]t is the price we pay for general recognition that a man’s fate
should depend upon his choice and this is to foster the prime social virtue of
self-restraint.”47 When someone lacks the capacity to make this choice—
whether from an inability to understand the facts of the conduct, comprehend
that the conduct violates the law, or conform behavior to the requirements of
the law—he does not deserve punishment.48
2. Self-Control in Insanity
The insanity defense is predicated on lack of self-control. If we accept, as
Roscoe Pound says, “the starting point of the criminal law . . . that a criminal
was a person possessed of free will who, having before him a choice between

44

Id. § 23.01, at 303–04.
Id. § 10.07, at 139, § 11.01, at 145–46.
46 H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 34, at 181–82.
47 Id. at 182.
48 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.03, at 346 (noting that just punishment depends on the rationality
and self-control of the criminal who performed the crime).
45
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right and wrong, had freely and deliberately chosen to go wrong,” then we are
inexorably led to his conclusion that “it was evident that if mental disease
inhibited or destroyed the will element or precluded the choice of right and
wrong, there was no crime.”49 In essence, a criminal is a person who
deliberately chooses to engage in behavior that he knows is wrong; we call this
crime because the person could have chosen not to engage in the behavior.
That is, that person could have exercised self-control over his actions and
opted for a different choice. When that choice-making process is hampered, by
whatever means, the system seeks ways to recategorize the resulting conduct.
A variety of perspectives on criminal law support the existence of the
insanity defense. For example, punishing those who are insane provides no
deterrent effects. As Dressler says, “A person who does not know what she is
doing or who cannot control her conduct cannot be deterred by the threat of
criminal sanction.”50 And, similarly, moral retributivists may support the
insanity defense because one cannot ascribe blame to severely mentally ill
people for their behavior when they simply “lack the capacity to do what other
humans are able to do: to act rationally or to control their behavior.”51 The
exception of the insane person highlights our most basic presumption of free
will: unless one is mentally diseased, we assume the capacity for free choice.52
As Dressler explains, “[M]oral responsibility for one’s actions is dependent on
the essential attributes of personhood, namely rationality and self-control.”53
Insane people lack these “essential attributes of personhood” and are therefore
not the appropriate subject of a moral evaluation.54
There are several basic tests of insanity, all of which rely to some degree on
a conception of the sane individual’s ability to control his actions. The
M‘Naghten test states that a person is insane if, at the time of the act in
question, he did not know the nature and quality of the act or did not know that
the act was wrong.55 This means that individuals who know what they are
doing, and that their act is wrong, are not insane. This test tracks a retributivist
account of self-control: we only punish those who could have chosen not to do
wrong. When an individual is unaware that particular acts are wrong, he does

49
50
51
52
53
54
55

ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 126–27 (1930).
DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.03, at 345.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.; accord Morse, supra note 27, at 783.
M‘Naghten’s Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.) 722; 10 Clark & Finnelly 200.
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not have the opportunity to try to bring his actions in line with the law, and so
he is not legally responsible for those actions. Criticism of the M‘Naghten test
has taken a self-control tack: the test does not include mental illnesses that
affect volition, but only focuses on cognitive disability.56 The rule, the critics
argue, does not adequately protect the individual who is “unable to control her
behavior.”57
In response to M‘Naghten, some jurisdictions added a third prong to correct
this omission: the “irresistible impulse” test.58 This test tries to reach conduct
that is apparently beyond the power of the actor to suppress, excusing the actor
from culpability if the actor “acted from an irresistible and uncontrollable
impulse,”59 the actor “lost the power to choose between the right and wrong,”60
or the actions were beyond the control of the actor.61 This test can even cover
planned behavior as long as the defendant “lacked the ability to control her
conduct.”62 Self-control has been deeply criticized as the appropriate test for
insanity63 because, as Dressler has noted, psychiatrists do not have an accurate
measurement device for the capacity for self-control,64 but it nonetheless
remains a common thread in judicial discussion of insanity.
Another test for insanity comes from the American Law Institute’s Model
Penal Code. There, a person is not responsible for his criminal conduct if, as a
result of a mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial capacity “to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.”65 From the self-control perspective, this
test suggests that if an individual has a mental defect such that she lacks the
ability to control her own conduct, she will not be held responsible for her
actions by reason of insanity. The federal insanity rule hews to the M‘Naghten
test66 but adds that it must be that the individual cannot appreciate the nature or
56

See DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.04, at 352.
Id.
58 See id. at 353 (citing Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 751 (2006)).
59 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
60 Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 866 (Ala. 1887)) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
61 Id. (citing Davis v. United States, 165 U.S. 373, 378 (1897)).
62 Id.
63 See Morse, supra note 27.
64 DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 25.04, at 354 (citing United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243, 248 (5th Cir.
1984) (en banc)).
65 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) (alteration in original).
66 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 356.
57
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quality of the act or its wrongfulness by virtue of a severe mental disease or
defect.67 Insanity defenses are not, of course, simply a binary test of whether
an individual lacked self-control.68 Many individuals who lack control over
their behavior in some way are not criminally insane; indeed, very few
defendants are excused from liability through the insanity defense. However,
defendants found insane do, by and large, share the characteristic that they are
not able to exercise self-control.
3. Self-Control in Justification and Excuse
There are many defendants who fail to meet the definition for insanity but
are nonetheless mentally compromised in some way that the criminal law
believes should make a difference with respect to culpability. In particular, as I
describe below, several doctrines suggest lesser culpability for those who are
not fully in control of their actions. I do not make an effort here to classify
justifications, excuses, defenses, or mistakes, or to offer a taxonomy of these
items. There are others who have undertaken that project,69 and the distinction
between justification and excuse is one that has received much scholarly
attention.70 The only aspect of these concepts critical to my analysis here is
how these doctrines understand and rely on self-control as a guiding principle.
My purpose is simply to address a variety of the ways in which criminal law
incorporates its concern about an individual’s ability to control her actions. I
consider below the role of self-control in the context of provocation and
intoxication.
67 The product test, also called the Durham test, stated that whenever a person’s behavior is the product
of a mental disease or defect, the person should not be held liable by reason of insanity. Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(en banc), superseded by statute, Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241–4247 (2006)), as recognized in Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573 (1994). This test has been abandoned. See Brawner, 471 F.2d at 973 (adopting the Model Penal Code
test). Its purpose was to streamline the test for insanity in order to give mental health professionals freer rein to
testify about a defendant’s insanity without parsing the defendant’s volitional or cognitive abilities. See
DRESSLER, supra 37, at 355.
68 For example, Pennsylvania courts expressly include lack of self-control in their definition of what
insanity is not: “Certainly neither social maladjustment, nor lack of self-control, nor impulsiveness, nor
psychoneurosis, nor emotional instability, nor chronic malaria, nor all of such conditions combined, constitute
insanity within the criminal-law conception of that term.” Commonwealth v. Neill, 67 A.2d 276, 280 (Pa.
1949).
69 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199,
203 (1982).
70 See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J. 1 (2003);
Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986); Kent
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984).
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a. Provocation
The very definition of provocation relies on a notion of the possibility of
losing control of one’s actions. One typical definition suggests that provocation
is “adequate” if it is “sufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose control of his
actions and his reason,”71 indicating the law’s reliance on a
reasonable/ordinary person standard in determining when provocation is
adequate. Dressler explains that there are two ways this plays out: first, one
measures the gravity of the provocation to the reasonable/ordinary person, and
second, one measures the level of self-control to be expected of a
reasonable/ordinary person.72
The law and theory surrounding provocation, or heat of passion,73 is
perhaps the most obvious place in criminal law where the rational actor model
clashes directly with moral theorists’ vision; this clash occurs precisely
because of the question of control inherent in the doctrine. The rational actor
model suggests that the greater the provocation, the less deterrable the criminal
actor will be. That is, the immediate benefit to the enraged, provoked actor will
outweigh the regular sanction, whereas the immediate utility to a nonenraged,
nonprovoked actor will not.74 The utilitarian model does not readily yield to
the potential for an actor whose actions seem “out of control” because of
provocation; instead, the suggestion is just that the utility calculation for these
individuals looks different. For a moral theorist, however, the “out of control”
question is one that directly implicates the degree of blameworthiness, and it is
partially for that reason that so much has been written on the question of
whether provocation is a justification (something that means that the act in
response is not wrong) or an excuse (in which case the act is wrong, but not
quite as blameworthy as it might otherwise be).75 The nature of the inquiry into
whether provocation is an excuse or justification stems from the kind of

71

State v. Guebara, 696 P.2d 381, 385 (Kan. 1985) (citing State v. Coop, 573 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Kan.

1978)).
72

DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 31.07, at 539.
There are four basic elements to a provocation/heat of passion claim. First, the actor must act in the
heat of passion; second, the passion must have resulted from adequate provocation; third, “the actor must not
have had a reasonable opportunity to cool off”; and finally, “there must be a causal link between the
provocation, the passion, and the homicide.” Id. at 535 (citing Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (Md.
1991)).
74 See POSNER, supra note 7, § 7.2, at 242.
75 See Joshua Dressler, Provocation: Explaining and Justifying the Defense in Partial Excuse, Loss of
Self-Control Terms, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 319 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (arguing that
justification serves as a partial defense).
73
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control the individual had over his behavior. So, for example, Reid Fontaine
explains that from an excuse perspective, the person who is provoked and
experiences “substantial emotional upset,” without which “he would not have
lost self-control,” is punished less than the person who “maintains his control
despite being seriously provoked” because “the provocation-resistant person is
controlled and rational when he kills the provoker.”76 Under a justification
theory, however, the degree of provocation is important regardless of whether
the actor experiences the subsequent emotional upheaval that leads to a loss of
control.77
Some states have adopted new, broader terminology meant to encompass
provocation and heat of passion. Specifically, the Model Penal Code provides
that a homicide that would be classified as murder without some special
circumstances can be considered manslaughter if committed as the result of
“extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse.”78 Again, self-control plays a role in providing the
defendant with a partial defense for his behavior. So, for example, in New
York a court may allow a defendant to exercise an “extreme emotional
disturbance defense,” which requires that the defendant produce “evidence that
he or she suffered from a mental infirmity not rising to the level of insanity at
the time of the homicide, typically manifested by a loss of self-control.”79 The
law suggests that there are some emotional responses that will so overwhelm
someone’s ability to think rationally that we may reasonably say that such a
person is unable to control his own actions because of his emotional distress.
States are not uniform in their approaches to extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, and many do not permit the use of this defense.80

76 Reid Griffith Fontaine, Adequate (Non)Provocation and Heat of Passion as Excuse Not Justification,
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 27, 45–46 (2009).
77 See Dressler, supra note 75.
78 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1985).
79 People v. Smith, 808 N.E.2d 333, 334 (N.Y. 2004) (quoting People v. Roche, 772 N.E.2d 1133, 1138
(N.Y. 2002)). “The defense requires proof of a subjective element, that defendant acted under an extreme
emotional disturbance, and an objective element, that there was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the
emotional disturbance.” Id. (citing People v. Moye, 489 N.E.2d 736, 738 (N.Y. 1985)).
80 See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial Justification and
Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2011). Only eleven states have adopted the extreme
emotional or mental disturbance language of the Model Penal Code. See id. at 1044.
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b. Intoxication
Although it is clear that being under the influence of drugs or alcohol can
impair one’s ability to control one’s behavior, courts have been unwilling to
allow defendants to evade culpability on this ground.81 For example, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court is quite typical in its ruling that loss of self-control
caused by voluntary intoxication provides no basis for the insanity defense.82
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court determined that a state’s statutory
prohibition against considering voluntary intoxication in determining the
existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense did not
violate the Due Process Clause.83 Despite the fact that the intoxication did
reduce the individual’s self-control, the Court held that the state need not
consider this information.84 As Justice Ginsburg wrote, it did not violate the
Constitution for the statutory regime to adjudge “that two people are equally
culpable where one commits an act stone sober, and the other engages in the
same conduct after his voluntary intoxication has reduced his capacity for selfcontrol.”85 The Court further stated that addiction does not offer a viable
defense to criminal responsibility when someone commits criminal acts under
the influence of a chemical to which he is addicted.86
For the rational actor, there are several choices for how to think about an
intoxication defense under a deterrence model. First, the rational actor ought to
include, in his original cost–benefit analysis regarding the use of alcohol or
drugs, the possibility of committing an undesirable criminal act because of that
use. For deterrence purposes, this could deter the substance abuse that would
have otherwise led to the criminal behavior. Alternatively, the utilitarian might
say that if an intoxicated individual truly cannot comprehend the costs and
benefits, or control his behavior to comport with his calculation, then
deterrence is not possible, and so there is no need for punishment.
A moral theorist, instead, might suggest that because the actor had the
initial choice to engage in behavior that led to the wrongful act, he must be
81 But see DRESSLER, supra note 37, at 326 (“Although it is true that self-induced intoxication as such
never excuses wrongdoing, the condition that intoxication causes, e.g., a clouded mental state,
unconsciousness, or insanity, may serve as an exculpatory basis in very limited circumstances.”).
82 See State v. Kolisnitschenko, 267 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Wis. 1978).
83 Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (plurality opinion).
84 See id.
85 Id. at 57 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
86 See DRESSLER, supra note 37, § 24.02, at 348 (“The common law treats intoxication resulting from
alcoholism or drug addiction as voluntary.”).
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held responsible for his actions.87 A moral theorist may distinguish between
situations in which the actor engaged in behavior unwittingly or deliberately.88
Our general societal stance toward drug and alcohol use, which suggests
individual choice as the basic paradigm,89 typically helps us to place the
unplanned consequences of a state of being that we have deliberately entered
into in a special category. That is, although we may lack control over our
actions while under the influence of a chemical substance, we believe that we
had control over the action of taking the chemical substance, and so we do not
lessen liability for those later actions.90
Newer research on the possible genetic and biological roots of addiction
has provided a potential critique of the free will assumption underlying the
refusal to lessen culpability for intoxication or drug use.91 Nonetheless,
although there may be an impulse to take drugs or consume alcohol that is
extraordinarily difficult to resist—perhaps just as (or more) difficult for some
to resist as an impulse in the face of provocation—the law considers drug and
alcohol use differently. As one criminal law scholar has said, “[W]e virtually
never know whether the agent is in some sense genuinely unable or is simply
unwilling to resist[.] . . . [R]esearch evidence concerning the characteristics
that help people maintain control when faced with temptation or experiencing
impulses is no more than a general guide.”92 Concerns about control permeate

87

See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of
Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1985).
88 See id. at 31–34.
89 The widely popular “Just Say No” anti-drug ad campaign of the 1980s and 1990s is one example of
this attitude toward substance abuse, suggesting that personal choice and responsibility are the main
determinants of drug use. See, e.g., Jerome Beck, 100 Years of “Just Say No” Versus “Just Say Know”:
Reevaluating Drug Education Goals for the Coming Century, 22 EVALUATION REV. 15 (1998).
90 Courts have acknowledged that addiction can be considered a type of disease, which suggests that its
consequences are beyond the momentary control of the individual; attempts to punish individuals for the status
of addiction, rather than for the act of using drugs or for acts undertaken while under their influence, have not
succeeded. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Nonetheless, courts have largely been
unwilling to exempt the taking of drugs, or acts undertaken under their influence, from criminal liability, even
when addiction leads to these events. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (refusing to hold that acts
committed while under the influence of alcohol, even if the defendant were an alcoholic, were exempted from
criminal responsibility); Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 2245, 2309 (1992) (noting that, following the decision in Powell, most courts have refused to hold that
acts committed while under the influence of alcohol or drugs were exempted from criminal liability, even if
the defendant suffered from addiction).
91 See Stephen J. Morse, Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
165, 169–72 (2006) (describing a strand of modern addiction research as “treat[ing] the intentional conduct of
the addict solely as the product of brain mechanisms”).
92 Id. at 187.
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the discussion surrounding intoxication defenses but point to a different result
than in some other areas of law because of our lay perception that the decision
to become intoxicated is within the control of the ordinary person.93
4. Self-Control in Mitigation of Punishment
Responsibility for criminal behavior is taken into account not just at the
time of determining what crime a particular defendant will be charged with or
what defenses are available to him but also in sentencing.94 When a crime has
been committed in a manner that somehow implicates an inability to control
one’s actions, the criminal may receive a lesser punishment than others.95 As
noted above, this supports a retributive vision of the law: we do not want to
punish someone who lacked the ability to control his own actions because that
person did not freely choose to engage in wrongdoing.96 There is also a
utilitarian defense for offering lesser punishment; as noted above, it is perhaps
an unwise investment in society’s resources to spend money on sanctions that
are not able to offer future deterrence.97
For example, in death penalty eligible cases, a defendant’s degree of
responsibility as determined by the jury plays a role in determining whether or
not the death penalty should be imposed. In the sentencing phase of death
penalty eligible cases, the defense and the prosecution both seek to present
evidence about the defendant’s character and crime that goes beyond
establishing culpability.98 The prosecution presents aggravating factors in an
effort to show just how bad the defendant’s actions were, and the defense
presents mitigating factors in an effort to reduce blameworthiness for the
defendant’s actions.99 Death penalty mitigation typically involves an effort by

93

See Robinson, supra note 87, at 7–8.
For example, federal sentencing guidelines allow for a downward departure in sentencing when
individuals have “significantly reduced mental capacity” that might render them incapable of being fully
responsible for their actions. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (2011).
95 See id. § 5K2.12–.13 (providing for lesser punishment when the defendant is unable to control his
actions due to coercion and duress, or diminished mental capacity).
96 See supra Part I.A.2.
97 See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. As previously noted, this is perhaps counterintuitive to
the insight of the law and economics scholar who suggests that, because the impulsive person is harder to
deter, he should face a greater sanction.
98 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193 (1976).
99 Id. However, mitigating and aggravating factors are not always easy for jurors to distinguish. See
Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating
Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 410 (1990).
94
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the defense to provide “humanizing and explanatory evidence” that will justify
a reduction in punishment.100
A defendant’s medical history, for example, may suggest problems from
conception onward that could include neurological defects, mental retardation,
fetal alcohol syndrome, chemical dependencies, or a wide variety of other
mental health disorders that do not rise to the level of insanity but nonetheless
suggest to the jury that the defendant was in some way incapable of exercising
full agency in deciding to commit the crime in question.101 Similarly,
documenting the “extensive poverty, neglect, and abuse”102 that may have
characterized the defendant’s childhood, and such conditions’ negative longterm effects, also may suggest to a judge and jury that the defendant’s capacity
to exercise control over his actions was diminished. The reduction in
punishment that mitigation strives for is rooted in self-control: an individual
who was afflicted with these medical conditions, or who had this kind of
upbringing, the argument goes, is simply unable to make the same choices and
exert the same control over his actions that another person might, and thus
should not be punished in the same manner.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH ON
SELF-CONTROL
The self is the basic building block of human society and human
interaction. Social psychologists consider that the self comprises three distinct
strands of experience: reflexive consciousness, which is about one’s own
construction of a concept of who one is; interpersonal being, which
encompasses experiences, behaviors, and relationships; and finally, the
executive function, which describes the self’s job as a decision maker and
agent.103 The ability to control one’s behavior and emotions is of particular
interest to psychologists: without this executive function, “the self would be a
mere helpless spectator of events, of minimal use or importance.”104 This latter
function was for many years the least studied of the three aspects of the self,

100 Craig M. Cooley, Mapping the Monster’s Mental Health and Social History: Why Capital Defense
Attorneys and Public Defender Death Penalty Units Require the Services of Mitigation Specialists, 30 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 23, 52 (2005).
101 Id. at 53–54.
102 Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 345 (2009).
103 Roy F. Baumeister, The Self, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 680, 680 (Daniel T.
Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998).
104 Id.
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but it has garnered more attention in recent years as research on self-regulation
and self-control has gained momentum.105
Self-regulation research began in the 1980s, initially growing out of
learning theory: just as rats might respond to a set of rewards and punishments
set up by a laboratory scientist, so too researchers thought that an individual
might devise her own set of rewards and punishments to induce or to
discourage certain behavior of her own.106 Self-regulation researchers have
studied how individuals regulate their thoughts, actions, impulses, and
feelings.107 Researchers have sought to understand why some individuals are
able to self-regulate toward future goals and away from undesirable activity,
while others find such self-regulation difficult.108 And researchers have
focused energy on how self-regulation affects individuals and society.109
Research has demonstrated that a lack of self-control is associated with a
wide range of negative outcomes, while high levels of self-control predict a
host of positive outcomes. Walter Mischel’s work on delayed gratification is
seminal in this area: he found that the ability to delay gratification in early
childhood is implicated in many of our most cherished long-term goals, such as
graduating from college or completing large projects at work.110 The ability to
delay gratification is implicated any time a large but delayed reward awaits
someone who forgoes momentary rewards: that is, in short, most of the time in
our lives. Developmental psychologists have identified this trait, which is
sometimes called “effortful control,” or the ability to inhibit a dominant
response in order to perform a subdominant response, as an important

105 See id. at 712. As Baumeister explains, it may be that, because so much of the executive function is not
dramatic, instead consisting of many small decisions that are easily understood as guided by the rational
pursuit of self-interest, it has been understudied. Accordingly, Baumeister notes, “[T]here has been something
of a premium put on finding ways in which people act contrary to their rational self-interest”—hence the surge
of interest in research on heuristics, biases, and other nonrational decision-making processes. Id. This research
“reveal[s] flaws in the executive function” and for that reason helps us understand how the executive function
works. Id. at 713. Throughout this Article, following the lead of scholars in the field, I use the terms selfcontrol and self-regulation interchangeably.
106 Id. at 716.
107 Id. at 717.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Yuichi Shoda, Walter Mischel & Philip K. Peake, Predicting Adolescent Cognitive and SelfRegulatory Competencies from Preschool Delay of Gratification: Identifying Diagnostic Conditions, 26
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 978, 982 (1990) (finding that very young children’s capacity to delay their
gratification in the face of a potential reward significantly correlated with higher SAT scores over a decade
later).
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dimension of temperament in children.111 Psychologists have suggested that
effortful control, which includes the ability to control one’s attention, to inhibit
certain behaviors, and, sometimes, to activate other behaviors, plays a critical
role in regulating individual emotion.112 Effortful control helps individuals
distract themselves from negative emotions and inhibits the expression of
negative emotions or behavioral expressions of those emotions.113
Research has shown that low effortful control in children is expressly
linked to negative qualities such as higher impulsivity.114 High effortful control
in children is also linked to compliance—particularly compliance that is
internally motivated rather than situationally required and that seeks to
suppress a particular behavior rather than initiate or sustain a behavior.115
Effortful control is also positively related to other positive dimensions of moral
development, such as conscience,116 empathy,117 and prosocial behavior.118
Control and its absence continue to matter as children grow up: at age
eighteen, individuals who are low in self-control are more impulsive, danger
seeking, aggressive, and interpersonally alienated.119 By twenty-one, low selfcontrol is related to an individual’s number of criminal convictions.120
Longitudinal studies suggest that the problem of self-control has an important

111 See Nancy Eisenberg et al., Effortful Control: Relations with Emotion Regulation, Adjustment, and
Socialization in Childhood, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS
263, 263 (Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy F. Baumeister eds., 2d ed. 2011) (quoting Mary K. Rothbart & John E.
Bates, Temperament, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL, EMOTIONAL, AND PERSONALITY
DEVELOPMENT 99, 129 (William Damon et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006)).
112 Id. at 264.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 270.
115 Id. at 268.
116 Grazyna Kochanska & Amy Knaack, Effortful Control as a Personality Characteristic of Young
Children: Antecedents, Correlates, and Consequences, 71 J. PERSONALITY 1087, 1102 (2003) (finding that
higher effortful control in small children predicted a more internalized conscience).
117 See, e.g., Ivanna K. Gurthrie et al., The Relations of Regulation and Emotionality to Children’s
Situational Empathy-Related Responding, 21 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 87 (1997) (finding that children high in
effortful control demonstrated more facial sadness while watching a sad movie than children low in effortful
control).
118 See, e.g., Nancy Eisenberg et al., The Relations of Children’s Dispositional Prosocial Behavior to
Emotionality, Regulation, and Social Functioning, 67 CHILD DEV. 974 (1996); Nancy Eisenberg et al., The
Relations of Regulation and Emotionality to Resiliency and Competent Social Functioning in Elementary
School Children, 68 CHILD DEV. 295 (1997).
119 Avshalom Caspi & Phil A. Silva, Temperamental Qualities at Age Three Predict Personality Traits in
Young Adulthood: Longitudinal Evidence from a Birth Cohort, 66 CHILD DEV. 486, 495 (1995).
120 Bill Henry et al., Staying in School Protects Boys with Poor Self-Regulation in Childhood from Later
Crime: A Longitudinal Study, 23 INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 1049, 1067 (1999).
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relationship with crime: low self-control at age fourteen predicted criminal
offenses at twenty and thirty-two.121 Self-control is directly linked to criminal
behavior, and it is also linked to the correlate of addiction and substance
abuse.122 Because drug use is itself unlawful and being under the influence of
drugs or alcohol is a significant predicate for many criminal activities,123 this is
yet another way that self-control failure is implicated in criminal behavior.
Indeed, psychologist Travis Hirschi has argued that the most important
individual-level trait of relevance to an individual’s propensity to commit a
crime is self-control; the commonality among all criminal acts is the provision
of “immediate benefit at the risk of long-term pain.”124 Hirschi and Michael
Gottfredson posit that criminal behavior, in contexts as diverse as juvenile
delinquency, violent crime, and white collar crime, is based almost wholly on a
lack of self-control.125
While some psychologists have focused on identifying the negative and
positive effects of self-control on emotions and behavior, others have been
working to formulate an understanding of how the process of controlling
oneself actually works. Of particular interest to psychologists is how
individuals self-regulate to minimize their engagement in undesirable behavior
and maximize their engagement in desirable behavior.126 The executive
function of the self means that there are few behaviors that we truly lack the
capacity to control, according to psychologists; as psychologist and selfcontrol researcher Roy Baumeister has noted, there are almost no “irresistible
121 See Lea Pulkkinen, Offensive and Defensive Aggression in Humans: A Longitudinal Perspective, 13
AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 197, 203–04 (1987); Lea Pulkkinen, Self-Control and Continuity from Childhood to Late
Adolescence, in 4 LIFE-SPAN DEVELOPMENT AND BEHAVIOR 63 (Paul B. Baltes & Orville G. Brim, Jr. eds.,
1982).
122 See Jay G. Hull & Laurie B. Slone, Alcohol and Self-Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION:
RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 466 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. Vohs eds.,
2004); Michael A. Sayette & Kasey M. Griffin, Self-Regulatory Failure and Addiction, in HANDBOOK OF
SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 505.
123 See Kathryn D. Scott et al., The Role of Alcohol in Physical Assault Perpetration and Victimization, 60
J. STUD. ALCOHOL 198 (1999) (finding a strong relationship between alcohol use and physical assault
perpetration); Samantha Wells et al., Alcohol-Related Aggression in the General Population, 61 J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 626 (2000) (finding that alcohol intoxication is associated with increased levels of physical
aggression); Helene Raskin White et al., Problem Drinking and Intimate Partner Violence, 63 J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 205 (2002) (finding that problem drinking is significantly associated with intimate partner violence
perpetration).
124 Travis Hirschi, Self-Control and Crime, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY,
AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 537, 537; accord MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A
GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 88 (1990).
125 GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 124, at 88–91.
126 See Baumeister, supra note 103, at 717.
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impulses,” demonstrated by the fact that few serial killers take action when an
armed officer is present.127 In any event, Baumeister suggests that it is not the
impulse itself that must be controlled, because impulses are automatic
responses to particular stimuli.128 Instead, resistance to the natural
consequences of the impulse is the key to self-control.129 How, then, do
individuals regulate their behavior and resist acting on impulses to engage in
certain behavior, and how, conversely, do individuals choose effortfully to
engage in other behavior?
In the past twenty years, psychologists have been particularly interested in
questions about how self-regulation works. Some researchers have suggested
that self-control represents a triumph of effortful cognition over automatic
behavior,130 while others have suggested that self-control describes behavior
governed by “cool,” cognitive behavior, rather than “hot,” affective, or
impulsive responses.131 Still others have characterized self-control as behavior
that is in accordance with rational preferences, rather than visceral reactions.132
And others have noted that self-control requires actions that comport with
long-term, rather than short-term, goals.133
Although different, these various theories are not completely conceptually
unrelated; they all similarly describe a struggle between two types of behavior:
on one side, the automatic, “hot,” or visceral short-term-benefit choice, and on
the other, the cognitively effortful, “cool,” or rational long-term-benefit choice.
Taken together, the varying theories offer a useful picture of some classic selfcontrol challenges. For example, consider smoking. Smoking may represent a
failure of self-control because even when one consciously wants not to smoke,
one’s automatic response may be to light up a cigarette. So, too, smoking may
appeal to the “hot,” affective system and may satisfy a visceral urge, rather
than being a cognitively effortful, “cool,” rational preference. And finally,

127 Roy F. Baumeister, Yielding to Temptation: Self-Control Failure, Impulsive Purchasing, and
Consumer Behavior, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 670, 671 (2002).
128 Roy F. Baumeister & Todd F. Heatherton, Self-Regulation Failure: An Overview, 7 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY
1, 2 (1996).
129 Id.; Baumeister, supra note 127, at 671.
130 See Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128.
131 See Janet Metcalfe & Walter Mischel, A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of Gratification:
Dynamics of Willpower, 106 PSYCHOL. REV. 3 (1999).
132 See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 288–89 (1996).
133 See Kentaro Fujita et al., Construal Levels and Self-Control, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 351,
353–55 (2006).
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smoking may satisfy a short-term goal of enjoying the experience, but it will
fail to satisfy a long-term goal of good health. Similarly, foregoing a fun
activity such as watching a movie in order to work and accomplish long-term
career goals, or engaging in an unpleasant action such as a painful medical
procedure because of its long-term positive health outcome, may likewise
involve overriding and replacing automatic or impulsive behavior with more
cognitively taxing behavior. This cognitively taxing behavior permits
individuals to act in line with their long-term, rather than short-term, goals.
Why are some individuals able to comport themselves in line with longterm goals or cognitively effortful, “cool,” rational preferences, while others
are overwhelmed by “hot,” visceral impulses or the lure of the short-term
benefit? The psychological self-control literature has developed a three-stage
model for how individuals comport their behavior to their wishes—that is, how
they exercise control over their actions.134 First, one must have standards—that
is, some kind of benchmark of ideals or goals.135 A lack of standards,
conflicting standards, or confusion about the relevant standard will impede
self-regulatory efforts;136 so, too, setting an inappropriately high or low
standard can interfere with self-regulation.137 Second, one must monitor one’s
behavior to examine whether or not it comports with one’s benchmark.138
Monitoring requires one to keep a close tab on one’s behavior; so, for instance,
behavior that reduces one’s ability to self-monitor, such as drinking alcohol,
can impede self-regulation in other areas.139 Finally, one must be able to
engage in what psychologists call “operating” behavior: that is, actually
altering the behavior that does not measure up to the benchmark so that it

134

Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 2.
Id.
136 See Robert A. Emmons & Laura A. King, Conflict Among Personal Strivings: Immediate and LongTerm Implications for Psychological and Physical Well-Being, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1040,
1045–47 (1988) (finding that conflict between personal striving and ambivalence results in negative
psychological and health effects, which supports a connection between personal strivings and personality);
Elizabeth Van Hook & E. Tory Higgins, Self-Related Problems Beyond the Self-Concept: Motivational
Consequences of Discrepant Self-Guides, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 625, 632 (1988) (finding that
individuals who possess conflicting standards are more likely to experience psychological distress, which
“emphasizes the importance of self-evaluative standards in self-guidance and self-assessment”).
137 Todd F. Heatherton & Nalini Ambady, Self-Esteem, Self-Prediction, and Living Up to Commitments,
in SELF-ESTEEM: THE PUZZLE OF LOW SELF-REGARD 131 (Roy F. Baumeister ed., 1993).
138 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 2.
139 Id.
135
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comports with the relevant standard.140 This feedback model is well established
as a basic premise of self-control research.141
The two most intriguing and dominant lines of recent self-control research
in modern social psychology concern how individuals evaluate present versus
future consequences, and under what circumstances the individual is able to
bring her behavior into line with her desires. This first line of research—on
“construal level theory”—attempts to unpack the mechanisms of self-control
by looking at the implications of differences in the way people process
information about events that will occur at different times. The second line of
research—under the umbrella of the “strength” model of self-control—looks at
the conditions under which self-control does and does not occur, suggesting
that because self-control requires such a level of cognitive effort, it is a limited
resource that becomes depleted over time. I consider these two perspectives,
respectively, in Parts III and IV below, along with their implications for
criminal law and theory.
III. CONSTRUAL LEVEL THEORY
A. Research on Construal Level Theory
Focusing closely on the tension between short-term goals or impulses and
long-term goals or rational preferences that inheres in self-control problems,
social psychologists have tried to understand how people may think differently
about near-future and distant-future events to determine if that difference can
account for self-control successes and failures. “Construal level theory” in
psychology has tried to integrate previous theories about this tension into a
coherent theoretical framework by suggesting that the reason people fail in
their efforts to act in accordance with long-term goals is because of systematic
differences in how people tend to conceptualize events depending on
psychological distance from the event. (Although psychological distance can
140 Id. This understanding of self-control processes was strongly influenced by earlier work by Charles S.
Carver and Michael F. Scheier that merged cybernetic theory with self-awareness theory to suggest that selfregulation operates in a “TOTE” feedback loop: Test how one is doing against a standard, Operate on the self
to change behavior to better comport with the standard, Test again to see how performance now compares to
the standard, and Exit when one has reached the appropriate level of behavior. See CHARLES S. CARVER &
MICHAEL F. SCHEIER, ATTENTION AND SELF-REGULATION: A CONTROL-THEORY APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 16 (1981). Such a feedback loop could also work to effectuate a goal of increasing distance
between oneself and a negative standard. See id. at 17. There may be important differences in the way that the
self regulates toward and against standards, but this has been relatively underexplored empirically.
141 Baumeister, supra note 103, at 717.
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include factors like social distance, most typically it is described as temporal
distance.142)
Construal level theory suggests that people typically construe events in the
distant future at a “high” level, thinking about those events broadly and in an
abstract way.143 These “high-level construals” encapsulate the central, defining
features that convey the essential meaning of the event.144 In contrast, “lowlevel construals” capture the concrete, specific, mundane features of the
event.145 For an example, imagine a high-level construal of the Thanksgiving
holiday—say, the importance of friends and family and appreciation of one’s
blessings—contrasted with a low-level construal—what time the turkey needs
to go in the oven or how to fit twelve people at a table for eight. The high-level
construal would be what one might experience in thinking about the holiday
during August, and the low-level construal is what one experiences in late
November.
In one set of studies, researchers first primed participants to think either in
low-level or high-level ways about a particular topic by asking some
participants to focus on reasons for maintaining good health or personal
relationships (typically invoking abstract concepts) and asking others to focus
on how one might maintain good health or good personal relationships
(typically bringing to the fore a variety of concrete steps that one needs to
take).146 In one part of the research, participants then assigned monetary value
to a variety of items, both for receiving the items immediately and for
receiving the items months into the future. When individuals were primed with
low-level construal rather than high-level construal, they demonstrated a
significant preference for immediate over delayed rewards, while individuals
who were primed with high-level construal were less likely to prefer the
immediate reward.147 The researchers concluded that, because of the
demonstrated difference in willingness to delay rewards, high-level construal
helps individuals exercise self-control.148 In another part of this research, the
participants were asked to squeeze a handgrip for as long as possible, with the
142 See, e.g., Kentaro Fujita, Seeing the Forest Beyond the Trees: A Construal-Level Approach to SelfControl, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1475 (2008); Nira Liberman et al., The Effect of
Temporal Distance on Level of Mental Construal, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 523, 532 (2002).
143 Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 403, 405 (2003).
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Fujita et al., supra note 133, at 354.
147 Id. at 354–55.
148 Id. at 355.
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promise that the longer they persisted, the more accurate self-relevant feedback
they would receive on their performance in the experiment. Here, individuals
primed with a high level of construal held the handgrip for a significantly
longer time period than individuals who were primed with low-level
construal.149 Again, because participants had to maintain control over their
handgrip performance—to persist at a fairly unpleasant task to achieve
accurate feedback—the researchers concluded that high-level construal helps
to facilitate self-control.150
In another set of studies, individuals who imagined scenarios described in
high-level terms were more likely to predict that they would feel bad indulging
in temptation than those who imagined scenarios described in low-level
terms.151 That is, potential self-control failure appeared to be more upsetting to
individuals who imagined the failure through a high-level lens. Other studies
have suggested that individuals’ preferences as to events in the distant future
tend to reflect greater self-control than those in the near future,152 which, when
considered in conjunction with research on temporal construal, suggests that
high-level construal may be a driver of self-control.
Construal level theory has been offered as one potential explanation for the
robust findings on hyperbolic discounting that have emerged from
experimental work in economics.153 Hyperbolic discounting describes a
general tendency to weigh events in the present or near future more heavily
than those in the more distant future.154 Construal level theory suggests that
hyperbolic discounting may take place because “the rich, detailed, and possibly
ambiguous information contained in real events is represented more abstractly,
in terms of relatively simple and structured mental models, when the events are

149

Id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
151 Id. at 363.
152 See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME 57, 58 (George
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992); Antonio L. Freitas et al., Abstract and Concrete Self-Evaluative Goals,
80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 410, 417 (2001).
153 See David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 445–46 (1997)
(defining hyperbolic-discount functions as those characterized by a high discount rate over short horizons and
a low discount rate over long horizons).
154 See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985)
(suggesting that temporal discounting is important in explaining criminality because the benefits of crime
occur at a different time than its costs); David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia 28
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11491, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w11491.pdf.
150
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expected in the distant future than in the future.”155 While hyperbolic
discounting suggests that individuals place more emphasis on near-term events
than far-term events, construal level theory adds an additional layer: the events
are not just weighted differentially, they are also conceptualized differently.
Construal level theory suggests that the individual contemplating committing a
criminal act construes events in the near-term and long-term in fundamentally
distinct ways that can produce a systematic bias in evaluation.
The difference between construal level theory and hyperbolic discounting
is subtle but important. Take, for example, a person contemplating an armed
robbery. Hyperbolic discounting means that when that person weighs the
benefits of the crime (money) against the possible sanction (prison), he will
discount the future sanction by some order of magnitude because it is going to
occur, if ever, in the future. This means that even if the costs of prison were
commensurate with or outweighed the benefits of the robbery, the costs of
prison as computed might not outweigh the benefits after these costs were
discounted because they would occur in the future. But construal level theory
suggests that the individual would contemplate the immediate act and the
future sanction in fundamentally different ways. The immediate act would be
most likely construed in its low-level way—for example, what actions are
needed to effect the robbery or what immediate benefit it will produce. The
high-level construal of the act—its wrongfulness or the potential for serious
harm to any of the participants or others—is likely to be less salient. In
contrast, the potential future sanction is likely to be construed in broad terms—
abstract punishment for wrongdoing—rather than in its specific, concrete terms
of imprisonment, daily isolation from family and friends, difficult prison
conditions, etc. Rather than performing a simple cost–benefit analysis (even
one that is “wrong” due to hyperbolic discounting), the potential criminal actor
is comparing dramatically different factors that may be hard to translate into a
cost–benefit equation.
Temporal construal also may affect rational probability estimates, further
casting doubt on the accuracy of the law and economics vision of a potential
criminal actor’s cost–benefit analysis. Recent research on construal level
theory and probability has begun to suggest that high-level construal may
actually reduce individuals’ estimates about the likelihood of an event.156 This

155

Trope & Liberman, supra note 143, at 406.
Cheryl Wakslak & Yaacov Trope, The Effect of Construal Level on Subjective Probability Estimates,
20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 52 (2009).
156
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means that the potential criminal actor may actually underestimate the
likelihood of punishment if that punishment is perceived as temporally distant
and therefore envisioned at a high level of mental construal.
Weaving together the strands of self-control research and construal theory,
psychologists have suggested that self-control “can be broadly conceptualized
as making decisions and acting in accordance with global, high-level
construal . . . rather than local, low-level construal.”157 In essence,
psychologists posit that the regulation of behavior requires one to act in
concert with high-level construals rather than low-level construals. Individuals
who are able to keep their mental representations of actions in line with highlevel construals, then, are better at self-control than those whose mental
representations focus on low-level qualities. So, for example, the individual
whose mental representation of smoking captures its health effects rather than
its pleasurable physical experience will be better able to refuse a cigarette,
while the individual whose mental representation of a painful medical test
involves maintaining good health rather than unpleasant physical experiences
will be more likely to keep her doctor’s appointment.
B. Implications of Construal Level Theory in Criminal Law
If self-control failure, as it is explained in psychology, means a failure to
appreciate the abstract nature of an event and to be swamped by its low-level
construal in the moment, how might this relate to criminal law? The first thing
to consider is what low-level and high-level construals might look like to the
potential criminal actor. Any potential object, event, or action158 can be
construed at a high or low level, and high and low levels will be defined
differently depending on the characteristics of the person doing the construing
as well as the situation. That is, construal level is in the eye of the beholder. As
Fujita and colleagues explain:
[F]or a student committed to performing well on final exams, an
invitation to attend a party while studying may create a conflict
between doing well on final exams (high-level concern that suggests
not going to the party) and seeing one’s friends (low-level concern
that suggests going to the party). . . . [W]hat are high- and low-level
concerns may change as a function of the situation or individual
differences. For example, for a person unconcerned about academics

157
158

Fujita et al., supra note 133, at 352.
Id.
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but for whom social relationships are highly valued, seeing one’s
friends at a party may represent a high-level concern, whereas
159
studying for final exams may represent a low-level concern.

This means that differences in construal are highly contextual, and both the
individual and type of crime may implicate different types of construal.
Because any construal level analysis will be person-dependent and contextdependent, it may be impossible to draw any broad inferences, but it is
worthwhile to at least begin to chart out some possibilities.
Imagine a potential criminal actor who is thinking about committing an
armed robbery tomorrow. A basic economic analysis of costs and benefits
would weigh factors including the amount of money likely to be made, the
positive use of the money (food, other consumable items), and other potential
benefits (enjoyment of criminal activity, perhaps) against the costs of the crime
(costs of materials used in furtherance of the crime, opportunity costs of other
possible activities during that time, potential punishment for the crime, or
mental disturbance from engaging in criminal activity).160 But, adding in the
insights from psychology, it would be easy to distill criminal activity into a
classic conflict between short-term and long-term goals. One’s short-term
goals are to get the value from the robbery, and one’s long-term goals are
presumably to avoid punishment (or, perhaps, not to engage in criminal
activity). And under construal theory, one could imagine that a self-control
failure occurs because the short-term act is seen in low-level, concrete terms
(immediate money), rather than in high-level, abstract terms (violating the law,
subjecting oneself to punishment by the state). If one could control oneself,
one would choose to have one’s actions comport with the long-term goal of
avoiding punishment and to be a law-abiding citizen. If the robbery were going
to occur next year instead of tomorrow, construal level theory predicts that the
potential actor would be more likely to think about the abstract elements of the
crime, rather than its mundane details, and would be more focused on the
potential harm to self and society inherent in the act (high-level) instead of the
money and purchasing power to be gained (low-level). This actor would find
the prospect of the robbery less appealing because it would be seen in its most
abstract form: with the potential for harm to self and others in the form of both
violence and punishment by the state.

159
160

Id. at 352–53.
Of course, not all of these factors may be applicable for every person contemplating an armed robbery.
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This simple paradigm is appealing, and taken at its face value, it provides
support for the idea that all criminal acts are a product of self-control failure.
Unfortunately, it does not adequately capture the host of possibilities for both
low-level and high-level construal inherent in a decision to engage in criminal
activity. So, for instance, low-level construal of an armed robbery
contemplated for tomorrow could include both positive and negative features,
such as buying a gun, getting money, being arrested or injured, putting food on
the table for one’s children, or buying drugs. High-level construal of these
same events could include providing for one’s family, righting some societal
injustice, paying one’s debts, endangering one’s own or others’ safety, or
violating the law.
What this suggests is that any one criminal act might be a triumph of lowlevel over high-level construal, meaning that it is a failure of self-control—but
it might not. It could be that a criminal actor focuses on the high-level
construal (say, providing for children) and overcomes his distaste for the lowlevel features of the crime to comport with those high-level goals. Imagine an
armed robber who, much like our patient who opts to undergo a painful
medical procedure because of its long-term health benefits, chooses to exercise
self-control by carrying out a criminal act to comport with his long-term goals.
In another case, it might be that both the abstract, essential elements of the act
and the concrete, specific elements of the act are in alignment for the particular
individual: perhaps the person thinks that the low-level details of the criminal
act are positive and that the high-level meaning of the criminal act is positive.
This means that there is no particular need for any self-control mechanism; the
person merely acts in accordance with his preferences. Construal level theory’s
vision of self-control suggests that crime is a failure of self-control only when
an individual has, somewhere in his mind, a goal of not breaking the law.161
Crimes by individuals who do not have this goal cannot be characterized as
self-control failures, just as smoking by someone who is an unrepentant
smoker or overeating by someone who enjoys being obese cannot be
characterized as self-control failures either.
Although the simple paradigm may be inaccurate in a number of cases,
there are presumably some situations where it is a reasonable representation of
how an individual may perceive potential criminal behavior. In those cases,
crimes that are unplanned or immediate may indeed represent a failure of self161 Whether this goal is a product of some belief in adherence to the law or merely a desire to avoid
punishment may be an important distinction, but for now I do not address this question.
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control; the individual acts in concert with his low-level construal of
immediate events and fails to act in a way that he might were he able to focus
on high-level construal. High-level construal, because it focuses on the
“cooler” aspects of the event, is thought to more closely track with what
economists would call rational thinking.162 This means that self-control failure
that is a result of temporal construal is a failure to “rationally” weigh the costs
and benefits of the action.163
For a utilitarian, these effects of temporal construal pose a serious threat to
the model of the rational criminal actor. Hyperbolic discounting can be
accounted for in the economic model: if individuals regularly discount future
events by some factor, we could simply increase punishment to compensate for
that discount. But if our prospective audience is not capable of performing a
standard cost–benefit analysis because it is construing short-term and longterm events in fundamentally different ways that cannot be directly compared
to one another, then the economic model is not particularly helpful. In essence,
temporal construal theory suggests that in order to turn potential criminal
actors into rational actors, the law must draw the potential criminal actor’s
attention to the high-level construal of the event in question. Without that highlevel construal to guide them, individuals are more likely to commit crime.
How might one best draw a potential criminal actor’s attention to the highlevel features of a situation? Are there sanctions with special features that can
shake the individual’s natural tendencies of temporal construal? It seems very
difficult to deter an action by an individual that will provide him with a host of
short-term benefits without in some measure forcing him to consider the
abstract and high-level elements of his action, and it is in turn difficult to
imagine a system that will be certain to remind him (as he contemplates
criminal activity) of these abstract features of crime and punishment.164 This

162 See Fujita, supra note 142, at 1483 (“Cooler, more cognitive thinking is generally linked to more
global, high-level construals, which may allow people to transcend the affective, appetitive features of a
temptation.”).
163 This dovetails with Stephen Morse’s explanation that “control excuses are best understood as
irrationality or internal coercion claims.” Morse, supra note 6, at 1656.
164 Recent government actions regarding public health concerns, such as obesity and road hazards,
comport with psychological findings about construal. For example, New York City’s recent push to post
calorie information on all fast food is in part an effort to change how individuals construe the choice to eat
particular foods. See James Barron, Restaurants Must Post Calories, Judge Affirms, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2008, at B4 (noting that the district court, in upholding the law, stated that providing calorie information will
lead at least some consumers to choose lower calorie options, thereby reducing the incidence of obesity). The
posting of calories serves as a reminder of the high-level construal of the act of eating, say, a Big Mac. While
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suggests that a system of deterrence that looks like our present one fails to take
into account some fundamental features of human information processing and
that the economic model of criminal decision making may not adequately
capture the way that individuals make decisions about criminal behavior.
For someone concerned with retribution, construal level theory poses a
different problem. If people have systematic ways of processing information so
that events at a psychological distance are seen in their high-level construal
and events temporally or otherwise near are seen in a low-level construal, then
various societal factors, such as temporal and social distance, ought to be taken
into account when deciding how much responsibility an individual has for his
actions. In addition, there are individual differences in construal patterns;
perhaps these need to be taken into account when considering criminal
behavior.
On the other hand, a retributivist may be able to take comfort from the fact
that the criminal actor focused on the wrong aspect of the situation, even if
there is a natural tendency to do such a thing. Instead of suggesting that the
focus on low-level construal—the short-term focus—excuses the actor, a
retributivist might consider that the actor inappropriately focused on certain
aspects of criminal acts and not others. When so many other individuals are
able to prioritize the high-level over the low-level construal, and when both
ways to construe a situation are plausible, the retributivist may not feel the
need to worry as much about the problem of self-control as an excusing factor.
In addition, this vision of misguided focus may offer support for a
differential assignment of responsibility for crimes that are premeditated and
ones that are not. Because research findings suggest that events in the longer
the low-level construal would focus on the taste of the burger and the enjoyment of satiating one’s hunger, the
high-level construal is about the longer term consequences of eating unhealthy, fatty foods.
Similarly, campaigns about texting while driving attempt to shift consumer focus away from the lowlevel construal—immediate gratification of communicating instantly with one’s friends—to the high-level
construal of potential danger and longer term risk to life and limb. See, e.g., A Message from Secretary
LaHood, DISTRACTION.GOV, http://www.distraction.gov/content/about-us/message-from-secretary-LaHood.
html (last visited Mar. 27, 2012) (describing a campaign initiated by the U.S. Department of Transportation to
end distracted driving). Interestingly, some of these campaigns attempt to invoke grave consequences by
depicting them in graphic and detailed ways—fighting a low-level positive construal with a low-level negative
construal. See, e.g., PSA Highlights Aftermath of Distracted Driving Crashes, WBALTV.COM (Mar. 3, 2011,
6:07 PM), http://www.wbaltv.com/r/27067600/detail.html (noting that videos discourage texting while driving
by “depicting the fateful moments leading up to a crash and the heartbreaking news at the hospital”). This
approach may be supported by new research suggesting that, under certain conditions, low-level construals
may help self-control efforts. See Brandon J. Schmeichel et al., Self-Control at High and Low Levels of Mental
Construal, 2 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY SCI. 182 (2011).
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term future are viewed at a higher level of abstraction,165 the person who
contemplates a criminal act in the future is likely to have a higher level
construal of that act. Higher level construal invokes classical rational
cognition, and so these actors, if they follow through on the action that they
contemplate, are thought to have acted rationally, which means that they have
self-control. For these actors, then, we have a situation where, under deterrence
theory, society has set the sanction too low to deter them. So we punish them
merely to make our system credible for others who may recalibrate their own
rational analysis accordingly. But for retributivists, the classical rational
cognition that is involved in the decision to take action means that this
individual is truly morally culpable and deserves punishment.
IV. THE STRENGTH MODEL OF SELF-CONTROL
A. Research on the Strength Model of Self-Control
Another line of robust self-control research over the last several decades
has demonstrated that self-control consumes valuable cognitive resources from
a fixed resource base.166 This has led to the “strength” model of self-control,167
also called in the psychology literature “ego depletion.”168 The basic concept
of this dominant model of self-control is that individuals have a finite supply of
energy, or strength, that can be used for self-control; when that self-control has
been used up, it is no longer available for some subsequent period of time.169
165

See supra notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
Although the strength model stemmed originally from the automatic versus effortful cognition model
of self-regulation, which can be integrated into the temporal construal model, the strength model itself has not
been explored vis-à-vis its relationship with temporal construal. As Fujita and colleagues have noted, “[A]
construal-level analysis is largely mute with respect to ego-depletion models of self-control. . . . [A] construallevel analysis . . . has little to say about the ego-depletion model’s core tenet that self-control is a limited
resource.” Fujita et al., supra note 133, at 364 (citation omitted).
167 The strength model has been experimentally tested against two competing models, the schema model
and the skill model. The schema model suggests that self-regulation is a set of behaviors that can be activated
by the appropriate setting so that, in repeated settings, self-control would remain at a similar level. Mark
Muraven et al., Self-Control as Limited Resource: Regulatory Depletion Patterns, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 774, 775 (1998). The skill model suggests that individuals ought to learn and improve as they
engage in repeated self-regulation, so that their performance in a series of self-control tasks ought to steadily
improve. Id. Research has not provided support for these theories but has provided support for the strength
model. See id. at 786.
168 Researchers have settled on the term “ego depletion,” rather than self-control depletion, because the
resource pool from which self-control comes seems to be broader, serving more than just a regulatory function.
See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Ego Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1252, 1252 (1998).
169 Id.
166
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The model suggests that different individuals have differing levels of selfcontrol.170 There are at least two important insights that stem from the strength
model of self-control. First, self-control is harder to achieve after other tasks
have used up an individual’s self-regulatory strength;171 and second, just as
strength of a muscle grows over time with practice, use of self-control over
time can ultimately increase one’s capacity for self-control.172
Because self-regulatory strength is a fixed resource, research has suggested
that other tasks can deplete this energy. Early research suggested that an initial
self-control task would interfere with effectiveness on a subsequent task. In
one notable experiment, psychologist Baumeister and his colleagues brought
participants into a room in which chocolate-chip cookies had just been freshly
baked.173 The participants were seated at a table on which the fresh cookies,
along with a few candies and a bowl of radishes, were already set. Participants
were asked either to eat only the cookies or candy, or to eat only the radishes.
Subsequently, participants were asked to complete an unsolvable problemsolving task. Individuals who had been asked to eat radishes (and had therefore
exerted self-control by not eating the forbidden cookies) spent significantly
less time working on the problem than those who had eaten the cookies.174
This result suggested that those who had exercised self-control in one task
found their self-control depleted when it came time to exercise it in a later
task.175
Subsequent research has suggested that it is not only self-control tasks, per
se, that deplete self-regulatory strength. Engaging in conscious choices,176
engaging in self-control over one’s emotional responses,177 undergoing
stressful experiences,178 and being reminded of one’s mortality179 produced

170

Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 3.
Baumeister et al., supra note 168, at 1263.
172 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 3.
173 Baumeister et al., supra note 168, at 1254.
174 Id. at 1255. The numbers were dramatic: the radish eaters spent a little over eight minutes working on
the problem, while the cookie eaters spent almost nineteen minutes plugging away. Id. In a control condition
where no food was eaten, participants spent about twenty minutes on the task, a number not significantly
different from that of the cookie eaters’. Id.
175 Id. at 1256.
176 Id. at 1256–58.
177 Id. at 1258–59.
178 Megan Oaten & Ken Cheng, Academic Examination Stress Impairs Self-Control, 24 J. SOC. &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 254, 254 (2005).
171
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similar diminution in research subjects’ performance at other self-control tasks.
Psychologists have concluded that there is a resource for executive functions of
the self that is affected by a variety of factors.180
Research on the relationship between emotions and self-control presents a
complicated picture. Empirical data suggests that emotional distress causes a
failure of self-control, and some research has suggested that this is because
people spend their cognitive resources on affect regulation instead of behavior
regulation.181 In an effort to change one’s mood or emotional state, one might
engage in behavior that one believes will change one’s affect, such as
overeating, drinking alcohol, or going to a movie when one should be studying,
even if that behavior is contrary to how one might act in a state of full selfcontrol.182 Thus, it is not that emotional distress itself uses up the same
resource needed for control of impulses; it is that individuals prioritized
another type of self-regulation—regulation over their affect.183 One study
suggested that “emotional distress interfered with self-regulation only when
people believed . . . that abandoning impulse control in a particular sphere
would allow them to reap rewards or pleasures that would be able to reduce
their distress and produce a more positive emotional state.”184 In any event,
whatever the mechanism at play, researchers agree that “emotional distress is
itself often a drain on regulatory strength, insofar as people try to cope with
and escape from the bad feelings. These efforts leave less strength left to use
for task persistence, resisting temptation, and the like.”185 On the other hand,
the effect of positive mood on self-control has been more mixed. Some
research has found that positive mood boosts self-control,186 but other research

179

Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Self-Regulatory Processes Defend Against the Threat of Death: Effects of
Self-Control Depletion and Trait Self-Control on Thoughts and Fears of Dying, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 49, 55–57 (2006).
180 See Baumeister, supra note 103, at 719.
181 Dianne M. Tice et al., Emotional Distress Regulation Takes Precedence over Impulse Control: If You
Feel Bad, Do It!, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (2001).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 64.
185 Baumeister, supra note 103, at 719. Baumeister continues, “Clarifying the relations between emotional
distress and regulatory success and failure will be one of the most theoretically interesting challenges of the
coming years.” Id.
186 See Barbara L. Fredrickson et al., The Undoing Effect of Positive Emotions, 24 MOTIVATION &
EMOTION 237, 238–39, 255–56 (2000); Tice et al., supra note 181.
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has found an opposite effect,187 and yet more research has found no effect at
all.188
One interesting recent finding is that individuals can “pace themselves”
with respect to self-control resources, essentially treating self-control as a
limited resource.189 In a series of experiments, Muraven and his colleagues
showed that when participants in an experiment thought that there would be an
upcoming task that would require self-control, they changed their behavior on
an earlier task to conserve their self-control.190 Additionally, participants who
had already used some self-control were more concerned with conserving their
self-control strength on an intervening task than others who had not done so.191
The researchers concluded that “forethought and desire to exert self-control
can lead to a breakdown of self-control in certain circumstances.”192
Individuals are more passive after they have used up their regulatory
strength, suggesting that there is a finite amount of volitional energy available.
Regardless of whether a subsequent task requires active intervention to
continue or to desist, individuals are more likely to choose the passive
response.193 So, for example, one study demonstrated that individuals who had
engaged in an initial series of choice-making behaviors were more likely, in a
second stage of the experiment, to passively watch a broken videotape that
showed no discernible picture than to alert the experimenter to the alleged
problem.194

187 See Melissa A. Cyders & Gregory T. Smith, Mood-Based Rash Action and Its Components: Positive
and Negative Urgency, 43 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 839, 840–41 (2007); Ayelet Fishbach &
Aparna A. Labroo, Be Better or Be Merry: How Mood Affects Self-Control, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 158, 158 (2007); Carrie L. Wyland & Joseph P. Forgas, On Bad Mood and White Bears: The Effects
of Mood State on Ability to Suppress Unwanted Thoughts, 21 COGNITION & EMOTION 1513, 1519 (2007).
188 Muraven et al., supra note 167, at 776–79; Harry M. Wallace & Roy F. Baumeister, The Effects of
Success Versus Failure Feedback on Further Self-Control, 1 SELF & IDENTITY 35, 38 (2002).
189 Mark Muraven et al., Conserving Self-Control Strength, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 524, 525
(2006).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 527.
192 Id. at 536.
193 Baumeister et al., supra note 168, at 1260–61. Individuals whose self-control was depleted were more
passive in their responses to movie watching; they watched longer when continuing was passive than when
continuing was active. Individuals without this depletion watched the movie for the same length of time,
regardless of whether the stopping mechanism was active or passive. Id.
194 Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Making Choices Impairs Subsequent Self-Control: A Limited-Resource
Account of Decision Making, Self-Regulation, and Active Initiative, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 883,
894–95 (2008).
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Recent research has also sought to understand the underlying source of
self-regulatory energy. Grounding the self-regulatory function firmly in human
physiology, a novel set of experiments looked to blood glucose levels after
self-control tasks to determine whether the self-regulatory resource had its
origins there.195 This series of studies demonstrated that self-control exertion
depletes blood glucose levels and also suggested that increasing blood glucose
levels caused a significant change for the better in individuals’ abilities to
regulate their behavior after an initial self-control task.196 Similarly,
researchers have suggested that sleep and rest, too, have a significant effect on
the self-regulatory resource.197 In sum, the strength model of self-control
suggests that there are many demands placed on the resource that individuals
also use for controlling their behavior.
The self-control resource appears remarkably difficult to alter as a baseline
matter, but there are a number of interventions that can boost performance on a
subsequent self-control task after an initial task has depleted the self-control
resource. The strength model of self-control research has suggested that, if
self-control is like a muscle, perhaps it could be strengthened over time
through practice.198 Researchers posited that strength could be improved in two
distinct ways: power (a stronger baseline capacity) and stamina (longer
perseverance before fatigue).199 In a short longitudinal study, Muraven and
colleagues tested self-control at one point in time, sent participants home with
instructions to perform a set of exercises in self-control, and then measured
self-control again two weeks later.200 By measuring baseline capacity at the
outset and two weeks later, as well as measuring the drop-off in self-control
performance between an initial and a subsequent self-control task, the
researchers were able to test whether self-control had improved over time and
whether any improvement was in the baseline capacity or in the resistance to
fatigue. Muraven’s results suggest that self-regulatory exercises during the
two-week period did yield an increase in self-regulatory strength—but not in
brute power because initial measures were similar.201 Instead, individuals who

195 Matthew T. Gailliot et al., Self-Control Relies on Glucose as a Limited Energy Source: Willpower Is
More than a Metaphor, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 325 (2007).
196 Id. at 333.
197 Id. at 334.
198 Mark Muraven et al., Longitudinal Improvement of Self-Regulation Through Practice: Building SelfControl Strength Through Repeated Exercise, 139 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 446, 448 (1999).
199 Id.
200 Id. at 451–52.
201 Id. 453–56.
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had practiced self-control during the two-week period were better able to
continue to exert self-control in a subsequent task in the later session than they
had been initially.202 As noted above, increasing glucose levels after an initial
self-control task also raised the level of self-control in a subsequent task, but it
had no effect on baseline self-control performance on “nondepleted”
individuals.203 Similarly, recent research has suggested that self-affirmation—
an event that bolsters the integrity of the self—also boosts self-control after
initial depletion but has no effect on baseline self-control.204 So, too, efforts to
increase self-regulatory strength through monetary incentives205 or through
boosting positive mood206 have failed to have an effect on baseline self-control
performance.
Of particular note for criminal law, self-control depletion has been found to
have an effect on efforts to control aggressive tendencies. Participants in one
study behaved more aggressively after a prior, unrelated self-control task than
those who had not been taxed in the same way.207 Specifically, participants
who restrained themselves from eating a donut were later more aggressive in
an unrelated setting; in addition, participants who exerted control over their
attention by watching a video while ignoring words on the bottom of the screen
or who completed a different mentally challenging task were later more
aggressive in response to an insult.208 Researchers have suggested that what
they call “angry rumination,” where someone spends time reviewing an event
that made them angry and “rehearsing acts of revenge,” also depletes selfcontrol resources and increases the likelihood of self-control failure.209

202

Id. at 451–52.
Gailliot et al., supra note 195, at 330–33.
204 Brandon J. Schmeichel & Kathleen Vohs, Self-Affirmation and Self-Control: Affirming Core Values
Counteracts Ego Depletion, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 770, 770–79 (2009).
205 Mark Muraven & Elisaveta Slessareva, Mechanisms of Self-Control Failure: Motivation and Limited
Resources, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 894, 903 (2003).
206 Dianne M. Tice et al., Restoring the Self: Positive Affect Helps Improve Self-Regulation Following
Ego Depletion, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 379, 379, 383–84 (2007).
207 C. Nathan DeWall et al., Violence Restrained: Effects of Self-Regulation and Its Depletion on
Aggression, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 62 (2007).
208 Id. at 64–68; see also David Gal & Wendy Liu, Grapes of Wrath: The Angry Effects of Self-Control,
38 J. CONSUMER RES. 445 (2011) (finding that the exertion of self-control correlates with subsequent angry
behavior in a variety of forms).
209 Thomas F. Denson, Angry Rumination and the Self-Regulation of Aggression, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
SELF-REGULATION: COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND MOTIVATIONAL PROCESSES 233, 234–35 (Joseph P. Forgas et
al. eds., 2009).
203
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B. Implications of the Strength Model in Criminal Law
If we take seriously the idea that self-control is a finite resource, this raises
several intriguing questions about the “out of control” actor. If factors
including the previous exercise of self-control, cognitive stress, and emotional
disturbance can deplete this resource, an actor under such conditions is truly at
a disadvantage when trying to self-regulate. This insight is captured by the
laws that authorize lesser culpability with respect to crimes committed in the
heat of passion or in the face of provocation, but it is rejected by the laws that
deny consideration of extreme emotional disturbance or other reasons for
diminished capacity. If all of these factors affect the self-control resource
similarly, this calls for a much greater exploration of the underlying reasons for
excusing self-control failures in some depleted instances and not in others.
For utilitarians, the strength model of self-regulation suggests that rather
than requiring an increase in sanctions to get that actor to recalibrate his cost–
benefit analysis, we may truly feel that there is no sanction that could make
him act in accordance with the law because he simply lacks the resources to do
so. For that reason, a strength model of self-regulation may suggest to the
utilitarian that no sanctions are necessary when the self-control resource has
been depleted.210 There are two countervailing arguments that may rescue
sanctions for the utilitarian. First, if self-regulatory strength is a resource that
can be self-consciously managed or conserved, then deterrence still plays a
crucial role: if an individual is aware that sanctions exist that will make his
exercise of self-control critical in the future, then he ought to conserve his
strength for those situations. Second, if we believe that self-regulatory strength
may be increased over time with practice, the existence of sanctions for
uncontrolled actions may provide an incentive for the actor to practice and
strengthen his self-control.
For the retributivist, too, the resource model of self-control tracks with the
notion that there are occasions when we feel that an individual actor who is
“out of control” already had those self-control resources severely taxed by
other conditions in a way that ought to lessen liability. Additionally, the idea
that the individual may simply have low self-regulatory strength211 may mean

210 But see Bradley R.E. Wright et al., Does the Perceived Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone
Individuals? Rational Choice, Self-Control, and Crime, 41 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 180, 205 (2004)
(analyzing data to suggest that the threat of punishment is most important for those who are low in self-control
and high in self-reported criminal propensity).
211 See DeWall et al., supra note 207.
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that we should consider this an innate defect, just as insanity or diminished
capacity may be. And, indeed, if control is a matter of individual differences,
where do those differences come from, and do individuals have any
meaningful control over their traits?212 This leads us back to the most basic
questions about free will and its role in law. As Robert Weisberg says, this
issue “seems to torture our best thinkers,”213 and it is without a doubt outside
the scope of my project here. But the strength model adds an extra step in
thinking about this issue: because individuals can improve their self-regulatory
function over time, we may consider them blameworthy when they have not
done so. While it is still true that some may lack the desire to improve, this
potential for improvement offers us the possibility that, with practice, anyone
could have learned to do better.
V. BROADER IMPLICATIONS
A. Doctrinal Implications
If one were to take seriously the psychological research on self-control in
the context of criminal behavior, how might one think about specific crimes
differently? Because criminal law spans so many different domains, it is worth
thinking about the implications in a handful of contexts. One could imagine,
for example, that the implications for self-control research might differ
between violent crime and white collar crime. I explore only a few domains in
criminal law below; the discussion does not seek to exhaust the many areas of
criminal liability but merely to show how the psychology research in selfcontrol plays out differently in several areas.
Because certain types of violent crime may often be a product of strong
emotion, the interaction between emotion and self-control is important in this
context. As noted above, an individual’s capacity for self-control is diminished
in the face of emotional distress. Research suggests that this is because an
individual’s executive function capacity is too busy working to improve affect.
Sometimes, this means that self-control in other areas will suffer as individuals
212 See Arenella, supra note 25; see also David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1623, 1655 (1992) (“The alacrity with which even thoughtful and sophisticated retributivists such as
Morse, Morris, and Dressler dismiss suggestions that economic, social, cultural, or psychological deprivations
might excuse or mitigate criminal conduct suggests that the harshly punitive attitudes of legal actors and the
public that were noted above are not misuses of retributivism but its logical outgrowth.” (footnote omitted)).
213 Robert Weisberg, The Values of Interdisciplinarity in Homicide Law Reform, 43 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 53, 75 (2009).
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make decisions that they believe will improve their mood. Here, it may be that
the very behavior that society would like individuals to control, the natural
consequence of their violent impulse, is directly connected to the negative
emotion they are experiencing and that the action they believe will ameliorate
their negative emotional state is the act of violence itself. If affect regulation
does trump self-control, some violent crime may be explained as an effort to
improve mood.
In terms of how violent crime relates to the strength model of self-control,
it seems that individuals who had other demands on their executive function
resources would be more likely to engage in violent behavior—in other words,
more likely to give in to the behavior suggested by a violent impulse and less
likely to be able to exert control over their behavior and refrain from acting on
the impulse. This vision of self-control tracks well with the law’s attempt to
carve out defenses for more impulsive and less premeditated criminal behavior.
But the law distinguishes between the various demands on our cognitive
resources in a way that the psychology research does not. That is, a taxonomy
of ways to exhaust the cognitive resource that self-control depends upon is not
freighted, in psychology, with any meaning: each way in which the resource
can be depleted is merely another in a list of potential depleting factors. But in
law, these factors are evaluated based on different criteria, including whether
the factors were, themselves, self-induced, and may also be evaluated
differently depending on whether one takes a retributivist or a utilitarian tack.
In addition, those individuals who are low in self-regulatory strength as a
general matter will also be more likely to engage in violent behavior. The
law’s use of the reasonable or ordinary person standard implies that there may
be a level of self-regulatory strength that we consider “reasonable.” And yet
empirical work has never measured the population in order to identify such a
level. Perhaps this is not a problem; if there is only a small percentage of the
population who violate the standard, we may assume that we have struck the
right point on the spectrum. But the self-regulatory resource model suggests
that more work on identifying further parameters of this strength would be
useful.
Interestingly, if one critical aspect of self-control is identifying the
appropriate norm,214 it may be that certain violent crimes represent a clash of
norms. Consider a cultural norm of self-defense: certain cultures suggest that

214

See supra notes 134–41 and accompanying text.
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the appropriate response to a threat or a provocation would be to defend
oneself or defend one’s honor through attack, whereas other cultures might
suggest that the appropriate response would be to seek help or to leave the
scene.215 Using the self-control feedback loop, someone who has identified the
self-defense or the substantial provocation norm may then conform his or her
behavior to the wrong (for society) norm. Some theorists, however, believe
that this type of situation represents an acquiescence to impulse and an
abandonment of self-regulation; someone may believe it is “appropriate,
reasonable, or even desirable to abandon self-control.”216 These scholars
suggest that culture plays a significant role in determining when individuals
choose to lose control over their behavior. Misregulation also suggests that
people may simply be wrong about their calculations of costs and benefits of
certain behavior. As Baumeister has explained, self-control failure may occur
because “[p]eople . . . are trying to control the wrong aspect of the process or
because they are trying to control something that is essentially immune to
control.”217
Premeditated crime suggests a different role for self-control research.
Premeditated crime draws attention to the failure of research in psychology to
fully explore behaviors in individuals that comport with those individuals’
goals, even if those goals violate society’s norms. But a foundational aspect of
self-control theory in psychology may provide a useful frame for this problem,
as well: the feedback loop that researchers have posited as crucial in
appropriate self-monitoring requires, initially, the identification of an
appropriate standard to test behavior against. When someone identifies a
standard that requires him to engage in behavior that involves planned violent
crime, he has chosen wrongly—but it does not mean that he is not engaged in
effective self-regulation. In this case, the psychology of self-control suggests
that the criminal actor has identified a (wrong) standard, but that he is effective
in making his behavior match his goals. Alternatively, the psychology of selfcontrol may suggest that the criminal actor has been irrational in his weighing
of the pros and cons of his action because of temporal construal. In either case,
however, the premeditated criminal actor, if he is aware of an alternative
215 For discussions of use of the “cultural defense,” in which defendants in the United States, typically
from another country, attempt to introduce evidence of their culture of origin as the basis for lack of
culpability, see James J. Sing, Note, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View of Provocation and
Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845 (1999); and Sharon M. Tomao, Note, The Cultural Defense:
Traditional or Formal?, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 241 (1996).
216 Baumeister & Heatherton, supra note 128, at 9.
217 Id. at 11.
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standard for his conduct or has overweighted the concrete gains of the action
against the more abstract harms, could be held to a higher standard because his
actions are fully self-regulated. In this situation, legal doctrine tracks the
insights of psychology by penalizing premeditating criminals with a higher
level of punishment.
White collar crime presents similar but perhaps even more complex
problems vis-à-vis the psychology of self-control. Corporations are filled with
highly educated individuals who have regularly delayed gratification in some
domains in order to achieve longer term gains. They are, in Mischel’s basic
terms, successful grown-ups.218 The research on self-control resource
development would suggest that these are likely to be individuals who are
highly practiced in self-control and who thus have a strong self-control
resource that ought to be slower to be depleted. This would suggest, then, that
these white collar crimes are less likely to represent a failure of self-control
and more likely, as with premeditated violent crime, to represent a problem
with identification of the appropriate norm by which to regulate one’s conduct.
In a self-control feedback loop, individuals in corporations may be most
concerned with controlling their behavior to comport with relevant office
policies and directives from superiors, rather than with the law. Therefore, selfcontrol may be quite high in corporate settings; it is just that it is used in some
instances to conform one’s behavior to a corporate norm that encourages or
even mandates criminal behavior.219
However, as with other premeditated crime, issues of temporal construal
may change the way a potential wrongdoer’s rational cost–benefit calculus
looks. The immediate, low-level benefits of wrongdoing such as altering
financial records—pleasing one’s superiors, posting quarterly gains, raising
stock prices—may be more appealing than the high-level construal of violating
professional and legal rules. However, high-level construal of financial
wrongdoing may include long-term career enhancement, in which case one
could not suggest that such criminal activity is a self-control failure as
psychology defines it. In some financial crimes, positive high-level construal
might not only suggest that the crime is not a product of self-control failure but
that it is actually a product of self-control.

218

See infra text accompanying note 110.
There is certainly evidence that corporate norms have a strong effect on individuals within the
corporation. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Steven L. Blader, Can Businesses Effectively Regulate Employee
Conduct? The Antecedents of Rule Following in Work Settings, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1143 (2005).
219
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If white collar crime represents a situation in which self-control is fully
present, both utilitarian and retributive arguments would suggest a
corresponding increase in punishment. The utilitarian would argue that the
costs of the behavior must be raised in order to alter the very deliberate
calculus about the criminal behavior, while a retributivist would suggest that
the full nature of the self-control provides support for stronger penalties.
Drug-related crimes raise very different self-control issues. Crime that is
committed while under the influence of drugs directly implicates self-control
failures: drugs and alcohol have an immediate and powerful effect on the
executive function’s capacity. Because drugs and alcohol impair cognitive
functioning, they necessarily have the effect of diminishing self-control.220 As
noted above, although psychology research—unlike law—does not make
normative distinctions between types of depletion, the self-control strength
model still provides some useful insight into this conduct. Even though the law
may be willing to acknowledge and consider demands on self-control in
determining culpability, the understanding that self-control is a strength that
can be developed through practice and exercise, as well as a resource that can
be conserved when necessary, helps make sense of the law’s typical lack of
openness to defenses based on alcohol and drug use. Individuals who use or
are addicted to alcohol or drugs are not developing their self-control strength;
indeed, they are doing quite the opposite. And because someone has depleted
his self-regulatory strength through his own choice of action,221 the law does
not accommodate an effort to alter the degree of his culpability or
punishment.222
B. Theoretical Implications
In contrast to legal theorists, who assume that individuals—including
criminals—mostly can control themselves, even if they sometimes choose not

220 For example, roughly one-quarter to one-third of prisoners report that the crime that they committed
occurred while they were under the influence of drugs. See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ONDCP DRUG POLICY INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE FACT SHEET: DRUG DATA
SUMMARY (2003), available at http://www.expomed.com/drugtest/files/drugdata.pdf.
221 I leave to the side the free will issue implicated in addiction. See supra text accompanying notes 91–
93.
222 For crime related to drug sales, rather than drug use, the picture is somewhat different. This crime,
using a self-control lens, looks more like other types of premeditated crimes because the individual’s selfcontrol has not been impaired by an outside influence. The first problem is a lack of the correct standard by
which to monitor one’s actions; the second concern is with the problem of temporal construal and its distortion
of present benefits to impair rational behavior.
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to, psychologists writing about criminal behavior have concluded that “crimes
practically define failure of self-control as it is usually conceived.”223 As noted
above, there is a host of evidence that low self-control is related to negative
outcomes,224 and there is a compelling empirical case that poor self-control is a
critical factor in criminal behavior.225 So, on the one hand, much of criminal
law and criminal law scholarship assumes as a baseline that most criminal
behavior is fully controlled behavior. Some smaller subset of criminal behavior
is due to “noncontrol,” that is, what amounts to a conscious choice not to
control oneself that is treated as identical to control itself. And some still
smaller subset of criminal behavior is due to a “true” incapacity to exert selfcontrol. In contrast, the psychological perspective assumes that most criminal
behavior is a product of an individual’s inability to control his actions.226
This tremendous difference may be accounted for primarily by different
conceptions of self-control failure between the disciplines of law and
psychology; these differences help to highlight the essential features and
implications of each vision. For legal scholars, failure of self-control is only
exculpatory when we believe someone “truly” cannot exercise control; any
other behavior is assumed to be a product of self-control. That is, when
someone simply does not, rather than cannot, control his behavior, the law
suggests that control continues to play a central role because that individual is,
at some level, in control of his decision to abandon control. Therefore, lack of
self-control only matters when we believe that the lack is compulsory, rather
than optional. But literature in psychology (and, relatedly, in criminology227)
suggests that all crime occurs because someone either could not or did not
exercise control, and furthermore suggests that the distinction between “could
not” and “would not” is immaterial. Indeed, psychological research challenges
the very existence of this divide, largely by ignoring it. Any time someone

223

Hirschi, supra note 124, at 540.
See, e.g., Ozlem Ayduk et al., Regulating the Interpersonal Self: Strategic Self-Regulation for Coping
with Rejection Sensitivity, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 776, 777 (2000).
225 See Wright et al., supra note 210.
226 See, e.g., Hirschi, supra note 124, at 540; Kathleen D. Vohs & Roy F. Baumeister, Understanding
Self-Regulation: An Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF SELF-REGULATION: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND
APPLICATIONS, supra note 111, at 1, 8.
227 Criminology focuses on “what actually causes crime and on how best to control it . . . .” Stuart A.
Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology: Power, Authority, and the Post-Liberal State, 23
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 857, 859 (1998). The scope of criminology goes well beyond concerns about selfcontrol, but it is a well-worn trope in the criminology literature that self-control failure plays a significant role
in producing criminal behavior. See, e.g., GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra note 124, at 89–91.
224
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violates societal norms, the psychological perspective stamps this a failure of
self-control.
This lack of nuance in the psychological literature calls out for attention.
When psychologists assert that all crime is a product of self-control failure, this
embeds an assumed set of shared norms that is simply not accurate. Research
that appreciates and examines differences in behavior between those who share
and do not share particular norms is critical to the development of deeper and
more sophisticated connections between law and psychology.
While the conceptual differences in “self-control” between the disciplines
of law and psychology may play some role in accounting for complete lack of
critical examination by legal scholars of empirical research in social
psychology on the mechanisms of self-control, these distinctions may
themselves serve as a useful catalyst for discussion about the role of selfcontrol in criminal law. While social psychology focuses not on the roots of
self-control failure writ large but rather on the causes of self-control failure
writ small, so too legal doctrine makes the same leap: questions of free will,
writ large, are outside the scope of what the criminal law will consider,228 but
purportedly smaller questions of individual control over particular acts remain
of deep concern.229 And yet social psychology casts a far wider net over selfcontrol failure. Even narrowing the scope of self-control failure to situations
where an individual truly does want to comport with the relevant societal
norm, the temporal construal problems that inhere even in efforts to act
rationally and the vision of self-control as a resource that is fairly easily
depleted both suggest that self-control failures in psychology are far more
common than the failures of self-control that the law is willing to recognize
and allow.
In particular, the contrast between what legal scholars and psychologists
conceptualize as self-control failure points up quite starkly that the law makes
normative determinations about when a loss of self-control is meaningful and

228 See, e.g., State v. Sikora, 210 A.2d 193, 203 (N.J. 1965) (“[W]e cannot accept a thesis that
responsibility in law for a criminal act perpetrated by a legally sane defendant, can be considered nonexistent
or measured by the punishment established for a crime of lower degree, because his act was motivated by
subconscious influences of which he was not aware, and which stemmed inevitably from his individual
personality structure.”).
229 See, e.g., Zamora v. Phillips, No. 04-CV-4093 (JFB), 2006 WL 2265079, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,
2006) (“In determining whether a petitioner has acted out of a loss of self control, the court will look at the
petitioner’s conduct before and after the homicide.”).

HOLLANDER-BLUMOFF GALLEYSFINAL

552

5/1/2012 7:48 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 61:501

when it is not.230 For example, as noted above, the law does not permit lesser
punishments when an individual fails to exercise self-control after drinking or
using drugs, even though the individual’s acts might be no less out of his
control than the acts might be in the face of provocation or heat of passion.
While psychology makes no special distinctions between the types of demands
placed on one’s self-control strength, the law draws many fine lines that do
not, in fact, delineate control or lack thereof as they purport to do but instead
reflect a normative judgment about the type of behavior involved.
CONCLUSION
Considering crime as a problem bound up with issues of self-control—a
premise central to criminal law theory and doctrine—suggests that legal
scholars and lawyers should take the psychology of self-control seriously. But
caveats are certainly in order. One important problem is highlighted in the
above discussion about temporal construal. Typically, self-control literature
posits self-control problems as those in which an individual must either resist
engaging in an appealing but undesirable activity, like smoking or eating
unhealthy food, or must persist in an unappealing but desirable activity, such
as exercising or maintaining a budget. Yet the psychology literature does not
typically differentiate between subjective and objective norms, so that
discussions of self-control behaviors often center around societally
undesirable—or desirable—activities without any test of the individual
perspective on those activities. Thus an “overeater” is perceived as having a
self-control problem whether or not he himself considers overeating to be a
problem; a smoker who does not view smoking or its potential consequences
as problematic is nonetheless considered to suffer a self-regulation failure.231
In the case of criminal behavior, a typical self-control failure as understood by
psychology would be when an individual adopted the objective norm of
criminalized behavior and understood that the behavior was undesirable232 but
230 Others have explicitly noted the normative nature of criminal law efforts around doctrine that centers
on questions of self-control. See Stephen J. Morse, The Irreducibly Normative Nature of Provocation/Passion,
43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 193, 205 (2009).
231 Thus, some researchers have described self-control from a motivational perspective: “If the person
does not have a strong inner desire to reach [a particular] standard, then merely knowing the standard is not
likely to produce effective self-regulation.” Joseph P. Forgas et al., The Psychology of Self-Regulation: An
Introductory Review, in PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-REGULATION: COGNITIVE, AFFECTIVE, AND MOTIVATIONAL
PROCESSES, supra note 209, at 1, 11.
232 Even if the temporal construal issues made this calculation tip in favor of the criminal activity, that
calculation represents a different situation from one in which the actor truly believes that the action is
completely appropriate, per some internal standard.
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was not able to control his behavior in order to comport with the law. The selfcontrol literature in psychology does not offer a perfect paradigm to capture
the behavior of the individual who adopts—and adheres to—a subjective norm
that violates the law. Another concern for application to law is the relative
paucity of psychology research on how, exactly, self-control can be developed.
However, as the self-control research continues to grow, insights from the law,
and questions that arise from seriously considering this research in light of our
legal system, should be taken more seriously in helping to develop appropriate
research questions for investigation.
Nonetheless, important principles emerge in considering psychological
research on self-control in the criminal law context. Research findings that
self-control is better when individuals can focus on high-level abstract
concepts about actions can help us think about what kinds of systems could
make such focus possible, but we must acknowledge that not everyone’s
abstract concepts about actions will, themselves, comport with the
requirements of criminal law. Similarly, findings that self-control is a finite
resource may help us to make better sense of the places in our criminal law
system where we hold an individual less culpable because of other factors that
have reasonably depleted that resource, and also may help us to be more aware
of the normative nature of distinctions among ways in which the resource was
depleted. Self-control research in psychology also offers a suggestion for both
prevention and rehabilitation: if self-control is a resource that can be
strengthened over time with practice, perhaps this is a fruitful area for further
development in our at-risk populations. Considering the major findings of
social psychology research on self-control as they relate to criminal law both
sheds light on, and poses further questions for, our conceptualizations of selfcontrol as a guiding principle in crime and punishment.

